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ABSTRACT
MERLIN, SAMUEL International Aid in Afghanistan: Examining the
Effectiveness of Traditional Aid and Development Programs. Department of
Political Science, June 2011.
Advisor: Michelle Penner‐Angrist
The US‐led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 brought to light the comprehensive
destruction of the Afghan state. Twenty years of continuous war had ravaged the
country, and with the Taliban’s expulsion of western aid agencies, Afghans were further
deprived of their basic needs. The international community has rallied around this
cause, donating nearly $40 billion in aid since 2001 to help develop Afghanistan.
However, this international investment has not yielded optimal results; fundamental
mistakes have limited the growth in capacity of the Afghan government and its people.
Through analyzing the effectiveness of the major donor programs, a key lesson was
learned: the absence of a unified development program has undermined the growth and
capacity of the Afghan government. International aid programs in Afghanistan have
revealed that providing a service of need trumps increasing the capacity of governance
and rule of law. The status quo cannot persist—short‐term humanitarian efforts have
been maxed‐out and need to shift to long‐term sustainable projects. To ensure the
success of the Afghan state and remove its dependence on international aid, it is
imperative to learn from past international aid mistakes and apply the proper changes
to Afghanistan.

2

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT

2

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

5

MAPS

7

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

11

CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL AID AND AFGHANISTAN

14

CHALLENGES WITH INTERNATIONAL AID AND DEVELOPMENT
FRAMEWORK OF CONTEMPORARY AFGHANISTAN (1978PRESENT)
ETHNIC DIVERSITY
PASHTUN:
TAJIK:
HAZARA:
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY:
THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL AID IN AFGHANISTAN
INTERNATIONAL DONOR CONFERENCES:
TOKYO, 2002:
BERLIN, 2004:
LONDON, 2006:
ROME, 2007:
PARIS, 2008:
CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

14
16
16
17
18
18
19
23
28
28
31
33
35
36
38

CHAPTER 3: DONOR MANAGED AID

44

INTRODUCTION
NONMILITARY AID
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT):
COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM (CERP):
AFGHANISTAN SOCIAL OUTREACH PROGRAM (ASOP):
DISTRICT DELIVERY PROGRAMS (DDP):
ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF):
MILITARY AID
AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND (ASFF):
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN (CSTC‐A):
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER‐DRUG ACTIVITIES (DOD CN):
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (INCLE):

44
45
45
61
67
69
71
73
73
79
83
85

CHAPTER 4: AFGHAN GOVERNMENTMANAGED AID

90

INTRODUCTION
TRUST FUNDS
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND (ARTF)
LAW AND ORDER TRUST FUND FOR AFGHANISTAN (LOTFA)
COUNTER NARCOTICS TRUST FUND (CNTF)

90
91
91
97
101

3

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

105

INTERNATIONALLEVEL
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPING THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
INTERNATIONAL‐LEVEL PROBLEMS IN AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT
STATELEVEL
AID AND DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN
HOW TO ENSURE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND A FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT

105
105
117
125
125
130
130

BIBLIOGRAPHY

137

4

List of Abbreviations
AACA
ABP
ADB
AIA
ANA
ANAAC
ANBP
ANDS
ANP
ANSF
ARTF
ASFF
ASOP
CDC
CERP
CENTCOM
CNTF
CSTC‐A
DAA
DDP
DDR
DFID
DoD
DoD CN
DoS
DST
DRA
EFT
EQUIP
EPS
ESF
EU
FATA
GAO
GIRoA
IED
IFC
IFI
INCLE
ISAF
ISI
JCMB
KMTC

Afghan Assistance Coordination Authorities
Afghan Border Police
Asian Development Bank
Afghan Interim Administration
Afghan National Army
Afghan National Army Air Corps
Afghan New Beginning Program
Afghanistan National Development Strategy
Afghan National Police
Afghan National Security Forces
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
Afghan Social Outreach Program
Community Development Council, Afghanistan
Commander’s Emergency Response Program
US Central Command
Counter‐Narcotics Trust Fund
Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
District Development Assemblies
District Development Program, Afghanistan
Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
Department for International Development, UK
US Department of Defense
US DoD Drug Interdiction and Counter‐Drug Activities
US Department of State
District Support Team
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
Electronic Fund Transfer System, Afghanistan
Education Quality Improvement Plan, Afghanistan
Electronic Payment System, Afghanistan
Economic Support Fund (USAID)
European Union
Federally Administered Tribal Areas
US Government Accountability Office
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Improvised Explosive Device
Intelligence Fusion Centers, Afghanistan
International Finance Institutions
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
International Security Assistance Force
Pakistani Inter‐Services Intelligence
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
Kabul Military Training Center
5

LOTFA
MLOT
MoCN
MoD
MoI
MoF
MOT
NABDP
NDCS
NIM
NMT‐A
NSP
OEF
OSC‐A
PDPA
NGO
PRT
QRF
SSR
UNAMA
UNDP
USAID

Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan
Military Liaison Observation Teams
Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics
Afghanistan Ministry of Defense
Afghanistan Ministry of Interior
Afghanistan Ministry of Finance
Military Observation Teams
National Area‐Based Development Program
National Drug Control Strategy
National Implementation Modality
NATO Military Training – Afghanistan
National Solidarity Program
Operation Enduring Freedom
Office of Security Cooperation – Afghanistan
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
Non Governmental Organization
Provincial Reconstruction Team
Quick Response Force, Afghanistan PRTs
Security Sector Reform, Afghanistan
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
United Nations Development Program
United States Agency for International Development

6

Maps

“Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, July 30, 2010.

7

Afghanistan By Ethnicity, 2009

“Afghanistan's ethnic diversity,” CNN Asia, August 19, 2009
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/08/17/afghanistan.ethnic.groups/index.html

8

9

“ISAF Maps & Logos,” International Security Assistance Force, NATO.
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/index.html

10

Chapter 1: Introduction
Afghanistan is a highly diverse and comprehensively destroyed country. Since
the US‐led invasion in 2001, there have been ongoing development and aid practices
that need to be analyzed for effectiveness. However, Afghanistan is a very complex
country, and in order to launch a successful development program it is important to
note Afghanistan’s diverse demography and recent political history. Powerful entities
are spread throughout Afghanistan, ranging from ethnic groups to tribes and power
brokers. The first chapter aims to outline the overarching goals of international aid,
while providing a brief historical analysis of the modern Afghan state, 1978‐Present.
Understanding the political history of Afghanistan is of fundamental importance in
order to maintain a strong and effective aid program in Afghanistan.
Over the last ten years nearly $40 billion has been invested in the Afghan state
from international donors. This massive international investment is dependent on
Afghanistan developing governmentally, economically, and socially. To ensure that this
investment is effectively utilized, aid must be analyzed based on where it is has been
spent, what projects it has supported, and what results or achievements this aid has
yielded.
Aid was analyzed from donor‐managed and Afghan‐managed entities, examining
the major development projects of each entity to deduce if projects and the aid funding
them are achieving positive results—further developing the Afghan state. This research
revealed glaring problems in the international approach to development in Afghanistan,
starting with a fundamental neglect of nation‐building activities in Afghanistan during
the first eight years, 2001‐2008. While aid has increased over the past five years, the
11

majority of this aid is still controlled and managed directly by the donor‐nation,
bypassing the Afghan government. The international community continues to pledge to
increase funding through the Afghan government, but in practice fails to do so. This
action, coupled with a continuing shortfall between pledged and allocated aid, has
resulted in lack of growth and development in capacity of the Afghan government.
Afghans are constantly left out of discussions and efforts to develop their country, a
fundamental flaw in development policy. As more aid is funneled into Afghanistan,
efforts need to be taken to ensure the government develops rule of law, specifically the
future capacity to tax its people.
As large amounts of aid remain in control of the donor‐nation and military
projects receive the bulk of financing, efforts to stabilize and develop Afghanistan
governmentally, economically, and socially will fail. To ensure effective aid and
development programs, and the greater success of the Afghan state, the international
donor community needs to take immediate steps to fundamentally change international
development practices. While poor relations between the US and the international
community with Afghanistan have directly led to concerns about fraud and corruption
within the Afghan government, increasing aid and international oversight of the Afghan
government will increase its accountability. Increases in aid through the Afghan
government and through international trust funds need to be implemented
immediately, followed by increased government capacity building activities.
Aligning aid and development practices with the priorities of the Afghan people
is the only way to achieve sustainable and durable development. Afghan‐managed
programs have suffered from a lack of international support and financing. Increasing

12

aid through the Afghan government will allow the Afghan government to allocate funds
where it sees fit, all while being closely monitored and regulated by the international
donor community. Strengthening the capacity of the Afghan government both to direct
development initiatives and provide for the needs for its people is the only way to
achieve sustainable development. The more the international community supports the
growth of the Afghan government, the greater the chance international aid programs
will succeed in developing Afghanistan.
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Chapter 2: International Aid and Afghanistan

Challenges with International Aid and Development
International aid and development projects serve an important role in
developing state institutions, infrastructure and economies. Over the past ten years the
international community has created a fiscally complex development and state building
project in Afghanistan. The process for allocating international aid and development is
incredibly difficult and challenging. While the goal of every international development
project is to benefit the nation at hand, aid practices often reinforce “patrimonial
elements” within the recipient state at the expense of the donor nation. 1 In other words,
if donor projects are mismanaged or poorly integrated into a nation’s government and
social system, they serve to promote anti‐developmental practices. In essence, a
paradox can form as these state building and development projects often undermine
state capacity. Moss’ essay further argues that if government or local officials are
withheld from involvement and a voice in development projects, the citizens and public
institutions of that nation view the projects as “scarce private goods to be allocated.”
With these concerns about the potential unintended detriment aid projects can have on
a state, it is important to evaluate these projects to ensure they are building up state
apparatuses and not rendering them ineffective.
Two major effects of international aid and development in nations are on state
revenues and the political regime. First, in terms of state revenue, a major aspect of
1 Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas Van De Walle. "An Aid‐Institutions Paradox? A Review

Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub‐Saharan Africa." Reinventing Foreign Aid. Ed. William
Easterly. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2008. 258‐63.
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international aid is to build up the state apparatus such that the state can eventually tax
its people and operate independently of international aid. Nicholas Kaldor argues that
the key for a state to move away from dependency on aid and towards economic self‐
sufficiency is the ability a state has to tax. 2 When a state develops the capacity to
effectively tax its people, the need for aid diminishes in the long‐term. However, the
large influx of international aid into a country, an alternative form of finance, replaces
the need for a state to collect domestic taxes in the short term. While this is not always
the case, countries that receive high amounts of annual aid—and Afghanistan is a strong
example—may see the aid as a substitute for state revenue and taxing.
Second, political regimes or state governments face serious challenges in
remaining strong and rational institutions in the face of increased international aid. As
the international community provides financing to foster basic state function, including
paying the recurrent budget and rebuilding state infrastructure, it is incredibly easy for
the recipient state to take a backseat position and let the international community work
directly with the citizens to provide for their needs. Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle
point to two major problems arising from this situation: first that the government is
rendered ineffective, and second that government ineffectiveness ends the relationship
between government and citizens. The state is supposed to function to serve the needs
of its people, and increased international aid can often bypass state government,
rendering it ineffective. If citizens begin to see the state only as a means for disbursing
international aid, or worse if the state has no hand in development projects, what role
does it serve?
2 “Causes of Growth and Stagnation in the World Economy,” Nicholas Kaldor, 1996, p. 8.
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Afghanistan represents one of the largest and most complex development
projects ever. Creating a functioning state in a country that has essentially been at civil
war since 1989 is difficult. Creating a functioning state in a country whose
infrastructure was destroyed by the US invasion in 2001 and is deeply divided along
regional and ethnic lines is an even bigger challenge. It is important to see the historical
context of international involvement in Afghanistan to understand how the
international community arrived at its current position in the rebuilding of an Afghan
state.

Framework of Contemporary Afghanistan (1978Present)
Ethnic Diversity
Afghanistan is a unique nation, combining a diverse population with a complex
and constantly changing dynamic of state governance ever since the fall of the Barakzai
Dynasty in 1973. Since the non‐violent coup of Mohammad Daoud Khan established the
Republic of Afghanistan in 1973, there has been constant turnover in the ruling party,
leading to constant rivalry among ethnic groups, tribes and warlords. Competition for
power at the highest levels of the political spectrum (President, Prime Minister, etc.)
has often left the citizens unattended to fend for themselves and live amongst their
communities. This modern period of the Afghan state has been marred with political
instability and external influence from foreign nations.
Afghanistan is primarily a Sunni Muslim state. 80% of the population, primarily
Pashtun and Tajik, is Sunni and a minority population of 19%, primarily Hazara, is Shia.
The three major ethnic groups that comprise Afghanistan are Pashtun (38‐44% of the
16

population), Tajik (25%) and Hazara (10%), with smaller minority groups of Uzbek,
Turkmen, Aimaq, Baluch, Nuristani and Kizilbash. 3

Pashtun:
The Pashtun speak Pashto, a Pashtun dialect of Persian, and primarily live along
the Afghanistan‐Pakistan border with roughly 10 million people spread across the
country from the north in Nuristan all the way to the west in Herat. While the Pashtun
are spread across the country, they are primarily concentrated in the Northwest
Frontier Province and Northern Baluchistan (Kandahar, Helmand and Zabol Provinces)
close to the Pakistani border where an additional 14 million Pashtun live. The two
major Pashtun tribes are the Durrani and the Ghilzai, which have provided the central
leadership for Afghanistan since the 1700’s. 4
Ghilzai Pashtuns ruled the Hotaki Dynasty from 1709‐1738, Durrani Pashtuns
ruled the Durrani Empire from 1747‐1826, and the Zirak tribes of the Durrani clan
ruled the Barakzai Dynasty from 1826‐1973. Historically, Pashtuns controlled and lead
the Afghan state, and that trend continues into contemporary Afghanistan. The Ghilzai’s
lead the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan after 1978, the Pashtun Taliban ruled from
1996‐2001 and now the current Pashtun rule of President Hamid Karzai. 5

3 “ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook,” Edition 4, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), March 2009, p. 80‐84.
http://publicintelligence.net/isaf‐provincial‐reconstruction‐team‐prt‐handbook/
4 There is an important distinction between tribal and non‐tribal delineation. Barnett Rubin
differentiates between the two that a tribe has membership defined by descent from a common ancestor
on the male hereditary line, while non‐tribal groups have no claim of genealogical relationship among
members.
5 “The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afganistan,” Richard Tapper, London: Croom Helm, 1983, p.
123.
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The Pashtun follow a unique legal and moral code called the Pashtunwali. The
Pashtunwali details social order and responsibility, much in the way Sharia law directs
social and political life for Muslims. The Pashtun ethnic group has been the dominant
group in power within Afghanistan since the 18th Century and its long trend of power
and control of the state will continue moving forward under the tutelage of President
Hamid Karzai.

Tajik:
The Tajiks are a non‐tribal, Dari speaking, Sunni Muslim ethnic group
comprising roughly 4‐5 million people in Afghanistan. Originating from what now is
Tajikistan, the Tajik people reside primarily in the Panjsher Valley, Kabul, Herat, Mazar
and the mountainous regions in the Northeast. The Tajiks that live in urban regions
work primarily as merchants, bureaucrats and clergymen. This high social ranking
arises from the Tajik’s literacy in Persian, long the language used in government, and
high culture that gave them a powerful role in Afghanistan regardless of who was
ruling. 6

Hazara:
Hazaras, the primary Shia minority, live in the central mountainous region of
Hindu Kush, which has since been named Hazarajat, the “land of the Hazara.” The
Hazaras are often persecuted not only for their Shia practices, but also because of their
6 Rubin, Barnett R. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International

System. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2002. p. 265‐267.
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different physical appearance being of Central Asian decent. The Hazara are
descendents from the Mongol conquests in Iran that controlled Hazarajat until Abdul
Rahman seized it in the late 1800’s. 7 Under Abdul Rahman, the Hazaras became
victimized and were sold as slaves. With strong history of oppression, the Hazara
currently see little social mobility.

Social and Political Instability:
With this complex ethnic breakdown of Afghanistan, social stability has been
even more difficult since 1973. While Afghanistan did see relative stability under the
Durrani and Barakzai Empires, recent political leadership has been marred with
political rivalry, armed conflict and an array of other challenges that have created an
unstable governing environment. This period of political instability and civil war began
in 1978 with the assassination of Mohammad Akbar Khaibar.
From 1973 until his assassination, Khaibar was a leader of the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) under the Presidency of Mohammad Daoud
Khan, President of Afghanistan from 1973‐1978. Uncertainty continues to surround
Khaibar’s death, as there is little clarity as to who planned and executed the
assassination. Rumors and accusations have ranged from suggestions that Khaibar’s
own political party planned his assassination to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a warlord and
political rival carrying out the deed. Regardless of intent, Nur Mohammad Taraki, a
powerful Pashtun warlord, saw this assassination as a weakening of the ruling party

7 “The Hazara of Afghanistan: The Thorny Path Towards Political Unity: 1978‐1992,” KB Harpviken, Post

Soviet Central Asia, 1998, p. 127‐131.
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and as an opportunity to seize power of the Afghan State. Taraki proceeded to lead a
successful coup over the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government
of Mohammad Daoud Khan. This coup, later named the Sauer Revolution, began with
Taraki leading his troops into Kabul, assassinating Daoud and his family and concluded
with the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on April 28,
1978.
Taraki led a Lenin‐style communist state (a dictatorship of the proletariat) with
strong relations and ties to the Soviet Union, but had strong internal opponents across
the country. Religious individuals held sentiments over Taraki’s banning of beards and
shift away from religion and Islam. Taraki also murdered Mujahideen, directly
increasing sentiment among religious sects. The Mujahideen being killed were receiving
financial and military help to fight against Taraki’s communist government from the
United States, United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, in addition to the intelligence support
from the Pakistani Inter‐Services Intelligence (ISI).
The DRA faced further internal conflicts over power between rivaling factions,
particularly between President Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin.
Amin had power struggles with Taraki, which led to Amin ultimately having Taraki
assassinated and replacing him as President in 1979. Amin himself was later
assassinated by the Russian KGB on December 27, 1979 and was replaced by Babrak
Karmal from 1979‐1986. 8 This period under DRA rule was marred with external
influence from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union feared what actual power and
influence it had in Afghanistan, which led to a Soviet invasion that began the Soviet War
8 Mitrochin, Vasilij, and Christopher Andrew. The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for

the Third World. New York: Perseus Group, 2005, p. 124‐136.
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in Afghanistan, lasting from 1979‐1989. The Soviet Union wanted to ensure its
influence remained strong, and thus invaded Afghanistan in 1979. 9
The Soviet’s tried to model the DRA, under President Karmal, on the Soviet
Union, placing Soviet advisors and officers—numbering over 10,000 by 1984—in
Afghanistan to implement all important decisions and overrule Karmal whenever
necessary. 10 These acts included writing Karmal’s speeches, interrogating prisoners
and creating institutions like the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
(modeled after the Soviet Komsomol). These efforts allowed the Soviets to better
control a large portion of the Afghan population. However, continued high‐level Soviet
action and influence failed to yield a centralized government as warlords and other
interest groups still independently vied for power. 11
External actors symbolized the Soviet‐Afghan war. The Soviets took control of
the Afghan state even with Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah acting as
Presidents of Afghanistan from 1979‐1986 and 1986‐1992, respectively. While the
Soviets controlled Afghanistan they faced strong opposition from Afghani Mujahideen.
The United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan all fearing the
communist expansion, continued to aid the Mujahideen in the fight against the Soviets.
The US government was practicing a policy of containment, but Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia had communism on their borders and felt a direct threat to national security. As
a result, these nations heavily trained, armed and provided intelligence and financial
assistance to the Mujahideen. Charlie Wilson, epitomized US Congressman from Texas,
9 Ibid, p. 152‐158.
10 Sinno, Abdulkader H. Organizations at War in Afghanistan and beyond. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2008, p. 123‐

126.
11 Ibid, p. 119‐124.
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led congress to pass Operation Cyclone, the CIA operation to provide weapons,
including stingers and additional anti‐aircraft weapons to the Afghani Mujahideen. 12
These actions proved monumental in forcing a complete Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan in 1989 under Mikhail Gorbachev. In the Soviet absence, civil war erupted
as the victorious Mujahideen shifted their battle to the incumbent communist DRA.
Over three years the Mujahideen fought the communist ruling party and eventually
forced the resignation of Najibullah and the DRA on April 16, 1992.
The following day, April 17, 1992, the victorious Mujahideen created the Islamic
State of Afghanistan. Barhanuddin Rabbani, leader of Jamiat‐e Islami, a group of Tajik
and Uzbek Mujahideen, assumed control as President in May 1992. Strong tensions
existed throughout Afghanistan between Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul
Rashid Dostum and intermittent fighting took place between the three rival warlords.
The Taliban, another rival group of radical Islamists saw this tribalism and conflict
between ruling parties as an opportunity to seize control of Afghanistan. The Taliban
began its push in 1994 by capturing Kandahar, Heart in 1995 and eventually Kabul in
1996, overthrowing the Islamic State of Afghanistan, torturing and publically hanging
former President Najibullah, and creating the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 13 Mullah
Mohammad Omar, Emir (essentially the de‐facto President) of the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, led a brutal regime founded on strict Sharia law combined with
Pashtunwali, the code of conduct for Pashtuns. Women and Shia minorities were
oppressed, drought ravaged the country, infrastructure was non‐existent and living

12 Meher, Jagmohan. America's Afghanistan War: the Success That Failed. Delhi: Kalpaz Publ., 2004, p. 139.
13 Sinno, Abdulkader H. Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2008, p. 223‐

250.
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conditions were some of the worst in the world. 14 The brutally oppressive Taliban
regime ended abruptly in 2001 with the United States invasion under Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF). The United States easily overthrew the Taliban regime,
forcing them to flee to Kandahar, the Northwest Frontier Province and Pakistan. The US
invasion set the precedent to create a new Afghan state that functions effectively,
provides for its people and contributes to the international security environment.
Afghanistan has a long history of political instability coupled with external
international influence. The destructive years of Taliban rule has made state building
measures immediately important but increasingly difficult. The Afghan state has a long
history of international aid and support, but this aid in contemporary Afghanistan,
1978‐Present, was focused primarily on arms, intelligence and finance, not state
building or development. As the United States currently leads one of the largest and
most difficult nation and state building projects, it is important to see the historic
impact and involvement of international actors in the Afghan state. Examining these
past projects and involvement will best introduce new and effective development
projects to help contribute to an independent, effective and modern Afghan state.

The History of International Aid in Afghanistan
Afghanistan has been a rentier state since its inception as a modern state under
Emir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1880. From that point on, the functioning and stability of

14 Afghanistan has historically had one of the highest infant and child mortality rates, and most recently,
according to UNICEF, had the highest international rank for children under 5 mortality in the world in
2008.
“Afghanistan – Statistics,” UNICEF, Country Statistics, 2008.
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html
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the Afghan state were directly dependent on foreign aid. Foreign aid, according to
Barnett Rubin, “culminated the century long project of creating a foreign aid‐funded,
Pashtun‐led, centralized buffer state.” 15 The British feared Russian expansion into
southwest Asia, and used Afghanistan as a buffer to stop Soviet expansion. The British
then financed and armed Abdul Rahman Khan in order for him to seize power and
control of Kabul, followed by the rest of the Afghan state following the Second Anglo‐
Afghan War in 1880. From that point on, Rubin argues that Afghanistan could not
function as a state entity without foreign aid and assistance. Rubin argues the recent
roles of foreign powers in providing weapons, finance and training to modern Afghani
Presidents Daoud (1973‐1978), Taraki (1978‐1979), Amin (1979‐1979), Karmal (1979‐
1986) and Najibullah (1978‐1992) were a major reason the nation survived as a state
entity. The United States and Soviet Union ending all forms of aid to Afghanistan by
1992 was a determining factor in the fall of the central state and eventual start of civil
war.
Soon after Gorbachev’s resignation on December 25, 1991, the United States and
Soviet Union agreed to measures to end involvement in Afghanistan. While a toppling
USSR had little ability to continue to have a hand in Afghanistan, the two nations
(through a series of Baker‐Shevardnadze meetings from 1988 to January 1992) laid the
framework for each nation to stop deliveries of weapons to Afghanistan, stop all aid to
all Afghan parties and expedite the UN solution to the Afghan civil war. 16 The removal

15 Rubin, Barnett R. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International

System. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2002. p. 265‐267.
16 US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze held a series of

meetings from March 1989 through December 1990 discussing US‐Soviet relations, arms control, human
rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral ties. A major aspect of these talks discussed the involvement of
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of international aid to fund and build the state of Afghanistan removed the purpose of
Afghan Presidents, who served as intermediaries for militias and mujahidin to receive
aid. Once the aid was removed, there was no need for a state and the northern militias
mutinied against the state sending Afghanistan into a period of civil war. 17
With international aid playing an integral role in state function and operation, it
is important to examine the overall mission of international aid in Afghanistan and the
manner in which aid is currently being utilized and delivered in the rebuilding and
recreation of the Afghan state. The goal of these international development projects is,
according to Barnett Rubin, “not to reconstruct Afghanistan… because they are not
trying to reproduce whatever existed in 1978. The goal is to build an Afghanistan that
will contribute to rather than threaten global security.” 18 Rubin’s definition does clearly
show how the Afghanistan project is more creating than rebuilding, but the overall
purpose of the international involvement in Afghanistan is to secure a stable, free and
democratic state.
With that interpretation of the international role in the creation of an Afghan
state, the international community became involved in Afghanistan during Operation
Enduring Freedom, which began on October 7, 2001 in retaliation for Al‐Qaeda’s attacks
against the United States on September 11, 2001. At the time of invasion, the United

both nations in Afghanistan. In meetings from December 9‐12, 1990 both sides agreed to the pretext to
end all involvement in Afghanistan. The following year, new Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin met
with Secretary of State Baker on September 13, 1991 and finalized the conditions by which each nation
would end relations with Afghanistan: ending all aid by January 2, 1992 and allow an Afghan transitional
government to hold independent elections with UN supervision only.
Rubin, Barnett R. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International
System. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2002. p. 265‐267.
17 Mutahir, Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Quarterly Survey,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 44, No. 4, October
1991, p. 9.
18 “Interview with Barnett Rubin on Afghanistan,” Q&A AsiaSource Interview, Nermeen Shaikh, May 2003.
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Nations Human Development Report rated Afghanistan as the second poorest country
in the world. 19 In December of 2001, the United States and prominent Afghans met with
the United Nations and drafted an agreement outlining the general creation of an
Afghan state. The Bonn Agreement was the document created that set the framework
for creating an Afghan constitution, a transitional administration and the means to hold
free and open elections for President, the National Assembly and Provincial Councils.
The agreement set the preliminary measures for the international role in creating a
fully functioning Afghan state. 20 For its own part, the United States passed the
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act in December 2002, which authorized Congress to use
federal funds for humanitarian, development and security assistance to Afghanistan.
Under the Bonn Agreement a primary measure “called upon the UN Security
Council to authorize the deployment of international forces in Kabul, what later became
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), so that the security of Kabul would
be guaranteed by a neutral, international force rather than by a particular faction.” 21
Authorized by UNSCR 1386, this represented a fundamental shift from having Kabul
being protected by a warlord to being secured by a neutral outside force. With security
ensured for the capital of Kabul, an emergency Loya Jirga was created to hold national
meetings, resembling what would later become a national government system. A Loya
Jirga is a grand council with representatives from each of the 32 provinces of
Afghanistan. Loya Jirgas have often been used throughout Afghan history as a means to
19 “Human Development Report,” United Nations Development Program, 2009.

http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
20 “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re‐establishment of Permanent

Government Institutions,” The United Nations, December 22, 2001.
http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan‐agree.htm
21 “Interview with Barnett Rubin on Afghanistan,” Q&A AsiaSource Interview, Nermeen Shaikh, May 2003.
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settle major political instabilities. This particular Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002 was
chaired by Ismael Qasim Yar, and had 1,600 delegates from all 32 provinces. This Loya
Jirga elected Hamid Karzai the President of Afghanistan with 1,295 votes. The Loya Jirga
also voted and drafted a constitution drafted based on political developments that
provided the framework for individual legal rights and protection on private property
with a fully functioning market economy. During first year elections in June 2002, 76%
of the population voted for President and 27 women were elected to the National
Assembly. 22
As the war carried on and the Taliban was ousted from the country, the need to
outline development and aid projects became a necessity. State building is a serious and
important matter, and as nations invest resources and time into the building of another,
it is important to ensure that the investment is managed and planned wisely. To plan
the rebuilding of Afghanistan, five donor conferences were held since 2002 in order to
outline necessary state development projects, secure international support and raise
money for the development of Afghanistan: 2002 in Tokyo, 2004 in Berlin, 2006 in
London, 2007 in Rome and most recently 2008 in Paris:

22 “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008‐2013, p. 1‐2.
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Pledges by Donor Conference 23
Conference

Pledged Amount (in $ billion)

Tokyo (2002)

$5.1

Berlin (2004)

$5.6

London (2006)

$8.7

Rome (2007)

$0.04

Paris (2008)

$14

Total

$33.4 billion

The pledged total from these conferences was $33.4 billion, which combined with $28.6
billion in supplemental pledging, yielded a total of roughly $62 billion of aid disbursed
in Afghanistan from 2001‐Present.

International Donor Conferences:
Tokyo, 2002:
The Tokyo Conference in 2002 was the first major international conference on
development and aid in Afghanistan. Japan, the United States, the European Union and
Saudi Arabia co‐chaired the event with representatives from 61 countries and 21
international organizations. The main goals of the conference were to garner support
for assistance to Afghanistan under the provisions in the Bonn Agreement: “establishing
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “Donor Financial Review” (2009), p. 19.
http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/Donor%27sFinancialReview%20ReportNov2009.
pdf

23

28

peace, representative governance and stability in Afghanistan, and eliminating
terrorism and narcotics production and trafficking.” 24 Thus, the primary focus and
concerns of the international community in the first year of development were security‐
based: removing the Taliban and terrorist insurgents and ending illegal drug trafficking.
Hamid Karzai, then Chairman of the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) and
current President of Afghanistan, highlighted areas the Afghan administration felt were
priorities for reconstruction in Afghanistan: paying the government recurrent budget,
education, health and sanitation, state infrastructure, establishing a currency system
and agricultural development. 25 The World Bank, United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) conducted outside research
assessing areas for Afghan reconstruction, and came to similar conclusions as the AIA.
A major concern voiced at the conference by International Finance Institutions
(IFI) and Non‐Governmental Organizations (NGO) centered on information sharing.
Because donor nations, NGOs, IFIs and the Afghan state were all planning individual
programs and projects, there was no central means to see what projects were being
conducted, where they were being conducted and who was involved. This systematic
lack of communication between donor nations, IFIs and the AIA caused confusion as to
where projects were happening and what resources were being utilized. To overcome
the information sharing disconnects, the World Bank and UNDP created a central

24 “Co‐Chairs’ Summary of Conclusions,” The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to

Afghanistan January 21‐22, 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/
25 “Statement of H.E. Hamid Karzai Chairman of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan,” The
International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan January 2122, 2002, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/karzai0121.html
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databank at the Tokyo Conference. This databank would centrally contain all
information regarding individual development projects from all participating
governments and organizations. Due to pledges and programs instituted at the Tokyo
Conference, more than three million refugees and displaced persons were able to
resettle in Afghanistan. 26
Peter Marsden provides a detailed evaluation of the Tokyo Conference in his
journal article “Afghanistan: The Reconstruction Process.” Marsden notes the overall
majority of aid was given directly to UN organizations, IFIs and NGOs and very little
went to trust funds that support Afghanistan’s government operation costs. Marsden
points to the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authorities (AACA) report on September
25, 2002 that revealed three major issues with pledging and donor assistance from the
Tokyo Conference: low percentages of pledged aid from the Tokyo Conference had been
disbursed; low percentages of disbursed aid were being used on transport, power and
telecommunications infrastructure; and the overall per‐capita aid received by Afghan
civilians was far less than that received by civilians in other recent development
projects in the Balkans, Palestine or East Timor. 27 In terms of disbursed aid verse
pledged aid, as of September 25, 2002 the United States had disbursed $350 million,
117.8% of its pledged amount for 2002, while Europe (all donor nations and the EU)
had disbursed $432 million, only 62% of its pledged amount. Nations were not being

26 “Berlin Declaration,” International Afghanistan Conference in Berlin (31 March – 01 April 2004),

Afghanistan Research Group.
http://www.ag‐afghanistan.de/berlindeclaration.pdf
27 “Afghanistan: The Rebuilding Process,” Peter Marsden, International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, January
2003, p. 93‐94.
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held accountable for ensuring that pledged amounts were being disbursed into the
Afghan state.
Ahmed Rashid clearly sums up the problems with the Tokyo Conference, as
“what Tokyo failed to do was distinguish between money for humanitarian relief and
money to rebuilt the infrastructure. … Most of the funds pledged at Tokyo were to be
spent on humanitarian relief rather than real reconstruction projects. No roads were
built, no electricity or water was provided to the Afghans. Afghans complained bitterly
that there had been no visible reconstruction, while donors would insist they had spent
a lot of money.” 28

Berlin, 2004:
The Berlin Conference in April 2004 took place three months after the
ratification of the new Afghan Constitution by the 2003 Loya Jirga. At the time of the
conference, great strides had been made in the state and institution building process.
Two Loya Jirgas were held which adopted the new constitution, elected Hamid Karzai
as President, re‐established the Afghan Central Bank, instituted new currency, adopted
a National Budget and established Commissions on Human Rights, Elections, Judiciary
and Civil Service. 29
All parties, the Afghan state and the international donor community, agreed on
the implementation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to have a

28 Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos: the United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan,

Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York: Viking, 2008, p. 178.
29 “Berlin Declaration,” International Afghanistan Conference in Berlin (31 March – 01 April 2004),

Afghanistan Research Group.
http://www.ag‐afghanistan.de/berlindeclaration.pdf
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presence in Afghanistan until an Afghan military and security team were effectively
trained and armed. NATO committed to expand Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)
to five additional locations by the summer of 2004. The continued formation and
training of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan
Border Patrol (ABP) ran concurrent to the disarmament and reintegration of militia
forces throughout the country. This process of reintegrating armed factions throughout
the country was carried out under the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR) initiative of the Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP). This was a Japanese‐led
mission to adhere to the principals of the Bonn Agreement, to ensure that “all
mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the
command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the
requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces.” The DDR initiative lasted
from 2003 until July 2005, when the Afghan government ended the disarmament and
demobilization phase of the DDR. The GIRoA, having felt all of the militia and armed
factions it could disarm and reintegrate into the ANA had been reached, ended the
program with almost 63,000 former combatants disarmed and demobilized, with up to
53,000 of those having been reintegrated into the Afghan National Army. 30
The Berlin Conference was the first conference where donor nations were
targeted to increase multi‐year funding and support through the Afghan government.
Multi‐year commitments were stressed because they allow the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to plan long‐term projects and future projects

“DDR ‐ Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” Global Security, July 15, 2005.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ddr.htm
30
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without the fear of lapsed funding. Increased support through the Afghan government,
or through contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), Law
and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan (LOTFA) and the Counter‐Narcotics Trust Fund
(CNTF), was also stressed as a means to directly increase the role of the central Afghan
state. Each trust fund targets a specific function within the Afghan government, as the
ARTF, the largest trust fund in Afghanistan (administered by the World Bank), has two
functions: providing funding to cover the recurrent budget of the Afghan Government
and creating a separate fund to allow the Afghan Government to create its own
development projects. The LOTFA, administered by the UNDP, pays for the training and
salaries of the ANP and provides the financing to maintain and develop security
equipment and infrastructure. The CNTF, also administered by the UNDP, was active
from 2005‐2009 and served to provide resources for the Afghan Government to fund
projects to follow the National Drug Control Strategy. 31
Funding through the GIRoA and trust funds gives the Afghan government a role
in its state’s development, a necessary measure to ensure the GIRoA develops state
functions that eventually can exist independently of international aid.

London, 2006:
The London Conference in 2006 yielded the highest amount of public pledging
for the development of the Afghan state at that time. The most important aspect of the

31 The goal of the National Drug Control Strategy, an Afghan created project, was to reduce cultivation

and production and disrupt the trade of opium to ensure a transition towards a secure and effectively
governed Afghanistan.
“National Drug Control Strategy,” Ministry of CounterNarcotics, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, January
2006.
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London Conference was the creation and adoption of the Afghanistan Compact. This
agreement was created in consultation with the Afghan government and the United
Nations to create the framework for international aid in Afghanistan for the next five
years, from 2006‐2011. The four major areas of focus in the Afghanistan Compact were
increased security, drug reduction, efficient government and economic and social
development. To ensure that projects were being held in the right locations, people
were having their needs met and the Afghan government was increasing its function as
a state entity, the conference agreed that the GIRoA would be responsible for holding a
nation‐wide census by the end of 2008. Through security, the Afghan government was
responsible for working to ensure that all armed groups were disbanded in all
provinces by 2007, while the ISAF and international community would expand its
presence across the country and increase PRTs. Measures would be taken by the ISAF to
ensure that the ANA reached a ceiling of 70,000 soldiers and the ANP and ABP reached
targets of combined forces of 62,000 by the end of 2010.
Under the Afghanistan Compact principle goals were assigned to both the GIRoA
and the international community. The Afghan government was responsible for creating
a detailed and prioritized Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), an
Afghan‐produced plan for state and government development with metrics on how to
monitor development efficiency. The GIRoA also was responsible for beginning to
expand and legitimize domestic revenue sourcing. This included the expansion, and
often implementation, of the state taxation system and customs duties. Afghan
responsibilities also included a two‐phased approach to international aid through the
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GIRoA, both reporting on the government use of donor assistance and establishing
percentages of donor assistance funneled through the government.
The donor community agreed upon the completion of the ANDS not only to
provide more multi‐year donor commitments, but also to shift responsibility of Afghan
development to the GIRoA. With future programs and projects coordinated with the
GIRoA and in accordance with the ANDS, development better focused on government
priorities, rationalized donor assistance, eliminated wasteful projects and increased aid
cost‐effectiveness. Coupled with increased multiyear commitments, increased
proportions of aid would be channeled through the GIRoA. This direct government
funding included core budget assistance as well as through trust funds (ARTF, LOTFA,
CNTF). A fundamental shift was also established among international donors to
increase the use of Afghan contractors and materials to help build up the Afghan private
sector, instead of outsourcing to contractors and companies within each donor nation. 32
The London Conference created an international acceptance that the Afghan
state would begin to increase its role in state development. This represented a major
shift in policy, as the Afghan creation of the ANDS would provide the means for
Afghanistan to take ownership over its own state and increase state function.

Rome, 2007:
The Rome Donor Conference focused primarily on judiciary reforms rather than
state development projects as a whole. As a result of the focus on judicial reform, very

32 “Afghanistan Compact,” The London Conference on Afghanistan (January 31 – February 1, 2006), North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), p. 3, 6‐7, 13‐14.
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf
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little money was raised for state development projects, $40 million. This conference
established priorities and projects for the Afghan justice system, including the Supreme
Court, Ministry of Justice and Attorney General’s Office. A “National Justice Program”
was presented and adopted by the GIRoA at the Rome Conference to aid in the
immediate and long‐term functioning of the Judicial System by providing protocol and
mechanisms to ensure effective jurisprudence.
A major aspect of state function is the effective use of a legal system. Establishing
the framework for courts and judiciary systems from the municipal to federal levels,
allows the Afghan government to serve an important state function in creating and
abiding by a code of law. Future meetings were scheduled between the donor
community and National Justice Program to monitor the judicial effectiveness and the
growth in rule of law in October 2007 as well as additional meetings from November to
March 2008. 33

Paris, 2008:
The Paris Conference has been the most important conference thus far. Not only
did it manage to raise the largest amount of pledged financing, but also the Afghan
government revealed the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) at this
conference. This represented a shift in the international aid and development paradigm
where Afghanistan began asserting itself as a state body to announce its own plan of
where aid and development should be focused. The international donor community

33 “Joint Recommendations,” Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan (July 2‐3, 2007), Italian

Foreign Ministry.
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announced it would follow the program outlines and objectives under the ANDS for the
next five years, through 2013. Under the ANDS priority would be given to the
agriculture, irrigation and energy sectors. By shifting focus to these industries
Afghanistan would be able to start a viable infrastructure system that would stimulate
agricultural and energy business within Afghanistan. The ANDS stressed that an
increase in internal employment in these sectors would directly stimulate international
investment, securing a strong foundation in state infrastructure. The Afghan proposal of
the ANDS revealed that the Afghan government did not view security as the primary
focus or priority in state building and development. Rather, improving state
infrastructure to increase internal and external economic activity was the primary
concern. The Afghan‐created ANDS shows how the Afghan government wanted to put a
stronger emphasis on individual needs through farming, water and infrastructure.
The Paris Conference also saw unilateral support from both Afghan officials and
the international community in holding national elections for President in 2009 and
Parliament in 2010. While the international community agreed to “provide increased,
more predictable, transparent and accountable assistance… as strengthened, and
accountable government institutions acquire capacity for management,” no specific
thresholds or targets were provided for any of the major donors. 34 A major problem the
GIRoA has had in terms of international assistance is that it has been difficult to plan
development projects without guarantees from countries on specific amounts of aid and
34 “Declaration of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan,” French Foreign Ministry, June

18, 2008.
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guarantees on multiyear assistance of that aid. The Paris Conference failed yet again to
hold international donors to a contract of a specific amount of aid provided over a
multiple year period, an issue aired years earlier at the Berlin Conference in 2004.
While the Paris Conference did declare that increased amounts of aid would go through
the GIRoA, it specifically mentions that aid will increase when the GIRoA is
strengthened and accountable. But, without detailing the framework for such a
situation, there is no universal understanding of at what point the GIRoA will be
accountable and when the international community will be held accountable to increase
aid through the GIRoA.

Current State of Affairs
According to the most recent Donor Financial Review from November 2009 from
the GIRoA, roughly $62 billion has been pledged to Afghan reconstruction since 2002.
Of that $62 billion pledged, $46 billion has been allocated, of which only $36 billion has
been disbursed (see chart below). Thus, only 58% of pledged money over the past 10
years has actually been disbursed to projects in Afghanistan. The United States
overwhelmingly has been the largest donor since 2002, pledging $38 billion from 2002‐
2013. The United Kingdom, World Bank, European Union (EU) and Japan have been the
other leaders in donor aid, and full financial figures for amounts pledged, committed
and disbursed are below:
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Donors Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan (Figures in US$ Million) 35
Rank

Pledge

Commitment

Disbursement

(20022013)

(20022009)

(20022009)

Donor

1

US

38,000

28,366

23,417

2

UK

2,897

1,810

1,546

3

WB

2,800

1,883

1,364

4

ABD

2,200

1,552

618

5

EU

2,037

1,973

1,576

6

Japan

1,900

1,378

990

7

Canada

1,679

1,206

898

8

India

1,200

1,236

662

9

Germany

1,188

1,044

584

10

Norway

938

598

324

Overall Total

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

62,035

46,099

35,450

With the United States leading the way as the primary donor in the
reconstruction of Afghanistan, 77% of all aid (~$29 billion) has been controlled and
used directly by the donor nations. This means the donor aid was controlled and
invested directly by the donor without input from the Afghan government. With an
overwhelming majority of aid controlled directly by the donor, it allows little to no
input from the GIRoA. The remaining 23% (~$8.7 billion) has been delivered directly
35 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “Donor Financial Review” (2009), p. 42.

http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/Donor%27sFinancialReview%20ReportNov2009.
pdf
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through the Treasury of Afghanistan, only $770 million of which has been placed fully at
the discretion of the Afghan government. Even after the Paris Donor Conference where
the international donors agreed to increase aid provided through the GIRoA, less than
¼ of all aid is managed directly by the Afghan government. This does raise a concern as
to whether the aid and development projects, in bypassing the Afghan government, are
actually serving to weaken the state. What role does the government have in its state if
almost 80% of all aid for development projects is out of their control?

Modalities of Assistance (20022009) (Figures in US$ Million) 36
Modality

Disbursement

Percentage

29,189.55

77%

a. Military Source

14,867.47

39%

b. Non‐Military Source

14,322.08

38%

8,691.07

23%

3,653.57

42%

Donor Managed Assistance

Government Managed Assistance
a. General Budget Support
1. Discretionary
2. Non Discretionary
b. Developed Support Through Trust Funds

770.35
2,883.22
1,495.00

1. ARTF

1,430.00

2. CNTF

65.00

c. Support to Recurrent Budget

3,542.50

17%

41%

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “Donor Financial Review” (2009), p. 42.
http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/Donor%27sFinancialReview%20ReportNov2009.
pdf
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40

1. ARTF Recurrent Window
2. LOTFA
3. US DoD
Grand Total

1,774.77
847.00
920.73
37,880.62

100%

The disbursement of donor aid for fiscal year 2009 was divided among six major
sectors: security, governance and rule of law, infrastructure and natural resources,
economic governance, agricultural and rural development, and health. Security received
an overwhelming majority of aid at 46%, with governance and rule of law at 13% and
infrastructure at 11%. Health received 8%, economic governance and agricultural and
rural development each received 5%, and the remaining money went to other
programs. 37 With security receiving almost half of all international donor aid, it is
questionable as to how successful security‐based projects have been and if security
requires such a high proportion of aid.
Following the most recent guidelines set forth from the Paris Donor Conference
in 2008, the international community will follow guidelines and development plans
under the ANDS for the next five years, through 2013. Under the ANDS, the Afghan
government has agreed with the international community that security is the primary
goal and priority interest of the GIRoA, and has been compensated as such:

37 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “Donor Financial Review” (2009), p. 25.
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The Government is fully committed to, and is giving the highest priority,
to successfully: (i) implementing an integrated and comprehensive
national security policy and strategy; (ii) building a robust security sector
reform program; (iii) strengthening civil and military operations and
coordination; (iv) increasing the role of security forces in counter‐
narcotics activities; (v) strengthening the civilian components of security
entities. 38
After ten years of development and war in Afghanistan it is questionable as to whether
Afghanistan will ever be able to function as an independent state. Barry Rubin quoted
Marshall Muhammad Qasim Fahim, Afghan Minister of Defense, who claims that he does
not believe in institutions (state bodies) and that it will be a long time before ‘zawabit
replaces rawabit in Afghanistan,’ or institutions replace personal relations. 39 With this
challenge in changing the fundamental dynamic of Afghanistan, Barnett Rubin has
further argued that Afghanistan has always been a rentier state, and without the influx
of international aid, the country as a central state will fall. In order to continue effective
state‐building measures of the Afghan state, it is important to see exactly where aid has
been given, what development projects exist and what the success of each project has
been to date. By analyzing development projects managed directly by the donor
community, through both military and non‐military means, and those managed by the
GIRoA, both through trust funds and support to the recurrent budget, conclusions can
be drawn as to the overall effectiveness of development projects. Analysis will be
conducted to review the state of nation building apparatuses and what changes need to
38 “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008‐2013, p.6.
39 “Interview with Barnett Rubin on Afghanistan,” Q&A AsiaSource Interview, Nermeen Shaikh, May 2003.
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be made at both the micro and macro levels of Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is going to be
a functioning and stable Islamic democracy, it is imperative that current development
projects, donor managed and government managed, be implemented in the proper
fashion so as to build‐up the Afghan state so it may function independently of
international aid in the future.
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Chapter 3: Donor Managed Aid
Introduction
Donor managed aid comprises the vast majority, roughly 77%, of all
international aid in Afghanistan. Nearly $30 billion has been disbursed from donor‐
managed entities, either through military or non‐military sources, from 2001‐2009. The
breakdown, between military and non‐military sources, is relatively even with military
sources receiving $14.87 billion and non‐military sources receiving $14.32 billion over
the same time period. 40
Non‐military projects—projects with aid funding state‐building, infrastructure,
education and other social, economic and governmental programs—include Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT), Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP),
Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP), District Delivery Programs (DDP) and
USAID’s Economic Support Fund (ESF). Military projects—projects where aid is used
directly to finance military programs, training, arms and weapons purchases, and
security infrastructure—include the US Department of Defense Afghanistan Security
Forces Fund (ASFF), US Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter‐Drug
Activities (DoD CN), US Department of State International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) and the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
(CSTC‐A).
These donor managed programs account for the vast majority (~80%) of
international aid to Afghanistan. While these development programs and international
40

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “Donor Financial Review” (2009), p. 19.
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financings are aimed to create a functioning central government with thriving
provinces in Afghanistan, by not involving the Afghan government in these donor
managed projects the international community cannot fully hold the Afghan
government accountable for its future success. The Afghan government is given little to
no say in what projects or programs are conducted, and even less involvement in where
money is spent throughout the country. The international community will not always
be present in Afghanistan to oversee aspects of rule of law, and again with a vast
majority of development efforts being run outside of the Afghan government, with little
input by the Afghan people, long‐term sustainability in Afghanistan remains a major
question and concern.
To ensure the development of Afghanistan is sustainable it is imperative to
examine the major donor managed projects. Researching both the non‐military and
military donor programs and analyzing the successes and challenges of each program,
will help to develop a future plan for increased success of donor managed projects in
Afghanistan.

NonMilitary Aid
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT):
Provincial Reconstruction Teams are one of the largest development projects in
Afghanistan, with currently 26 PRTs covering 32 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. PRTs
were created in 2003, a few years after the ISAF seized control of Kabul in 2001, in
order to create joint military‐civilian organizations in provinces. PRTs are controlled by
an outside nation or coalition of nations that creates programs to eliminate the
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insurgency from the province in question in the short‐term, and create the framework
to ensure the province does not fall back into the hands of the insurgency in the long‐
term. 41
The day‐to‐day practices PRTs engage in are to create projects that deliver basic
needs and services: security, law and order, justice, healthcare, education, etc. 42 In
order to create and outline the leadership and operational responsibilities of PRTs the
PRT Executive Steering Committee was created on January 27, 2005. Ambassador Karl
Eikenberry currently heads the committee. To further outline programs, practices and
responsibilities, the PRT Executive Steering Committee created the “PRT Terms of
Reference,” a document which outlined the role of PRTs, noting that “PRTs will assist
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the
development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations,
and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.” 43 These guidelines
created nine leadership roles within the PRT system: PRT Commander (a Lieutenant
Colonel or Colonel), Military Commander, Diplomatic Officer, Development Officer,
Police Officer/Advisor/Mentor (may be EUPOL, military or contractor personnel),
Civilian Experts, Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff and CJ9 Section. 44
While PRTs are primarily focused on providing quick impact projects, specific
security sector objectives were outlined for PRTs as well, including compound security,
force protection escorts and tactical reserves or a Quick Response Force (QRF). Ideally,
41 “ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook,” Edition 4, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), March 2009, p. 4.
http://publicintelligence.net/isaf‐provincial‐reconstruction‐team‐prt‐handbook/
42 Ibid, p. 4, 8‐9.
43 Ibid, p. 3, 21.
44 Ibid, p. 24‐25
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these security forces would integrate members of both the ISAF with Afghani security
forces. Another major aspect for security operations in PRTs is mobile patrolling.
Military Observations Teams (MOTs) or Military Liaison and Observation Teams
(MLOTs) are the groups sent out to conduct mobile patrolling, a key in strengthening
the GIRoA’s outreach across the country. Mobile patrolling allows the PRT to share
information with the people, conduct mediation across the province and best identify
needs and project priorities. 45
With leadership teams in place and guidelines outlined, the first four PRTs were
created by the US under OEF: Gardez, covering the Paktia and Lowgar Provinces,
Kunduz, covering both Kunduz and Takhar Provinces, Bamian, covering the Bamian
Province, and Mazar‐e Sharif, covering the Balkh, Sar‐e Pol, Jawzjan and Samangan
Provinces. The first four PRTs were strategically placed to cover provinces with large
populations of each of the four largest ethnic groups: Pashtun (Gardez PRT), Tajik
(Kunduz PRT), Hazara (Bamian PRT) and Uzbek (Mazar‐e Sharif PRT). 46
The Kunduz PRT, which has been led by Germany since December 2003, has
been very successful in creating information technology and infrastructure over the
past five years. Specifically, Germany oversaw the creation of a Dari language radio
station and the creation of a three‐language newspaper (printed in Dari, Pashto and
English), which has directly resulted in increased ethnic cohesion within the province. 47

45 “PRT Playbook: Tactics Techniques and Procedures,” Center for Army Lessons Learned, No. 07‐34,

September 2007, p. 68.
46 “ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook,” Edition 4, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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The Mazar‐e Sharif PRT, led by Sweden since March 2006, achieved a major
success through settling the Dostum‐Atta conflict, a major problem that led to armed
conflict and division between two of the largest tribes within in the province. The
Dostum‐Atta conflict began soon after the removal of the Taliban from power in 2001.
Abdul Rashid Dostum, currently an ANA general and Hamid Karzai’s Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the ANA, was a military leader of the Northern Alliance during
the conquest of Kabul in 2001. Dostum’s forces, primarily Uzbek, often clashed with
forces loyal to Tajik General Ustad Atta Mohammed Noor. General Atta's men
kidnapped and killed a number of Dostum's men, and Dostum’s men responded with
their own killings of Atta’s forces. Each side reciprocated the killings and constant
agitation between the warlords and ethnic groups led to a major conflict in Afghanistan.
With Swedish mediation through the Mazar‐e Sharif PRT, the conflict between two
powerful warlords has ceased and Dostum and Atta have worked together on a federal
project to ensure that benefits and care are provided to Afghan war veterans. 48
The next four PRTs created by the US represented a dynamic shift in intentions
and goals. These PRTs were specifically created not to best reach the Afghan people, but
rather to create an international presence in strategic provinces for military gains. 49
The PRTs were created in Bagram, covering both the Parwan and Kapisa provinces,
Herat, Jalalabad, covering the Nagarhar province, and in Kandahar. The Bagram PRT
was created to protect and utilize the Bagram Air Base, a key military asset for the
international community. Herat is the second largest city in Afghanistan and is the
48 “Conflict Analysis: Kunduz city, Kunduz Province,” Lawrence Devlin, Jacob Rinck, Christian Dennys and
Idrees Zaman, Cooperation for Peace and Unity, March 2009.
49 “ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook,” Edition 4, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), March 2009, p. 93.
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home to Northern Alliance warlord and US ally, Ismael Khan. Jalalabad is the province
into which insurgents and warlords and now terrorists cross into Afghanistan from the
south, making it militarily strategic to the task of blocking the flow of any insurgents
into Afghanistan. Kandahar is of course the spiritual home of the Taliban and the focal
point of the ongoing military objective in Afghanistan.
The Kandahar PRT was taken over by Canada in August 2005, which has since
handled an incredibly challenging province with poise and success. General Rick Hillier,
chief of Canada’s Defense Staff, specifically advocated for Canada to takeover the
challenging Kandahar PRT. Hillier specifically chose the Kandahar PRT for several
reasons, primarily because it put Canada in a high‐profile role that received a great deal
of international attention and exposure. Also, the Kandahar PRT is geographically close
to the Kandahar Airfield, which made retrieving incoming shipments of weapons,
ammo, or equipment very simple and at the same time was convenient in case of the
need to evacuate. Militarily, it allowed Canada to take part in combat and shed its image
as a peacekeeping nation, while working closely with the US and repair its
relationship. 50
The Canadian PRT in Kandahar set out to work on three main projects: repairing
the Dahla Dam, eradicating polio, and increasing education. Repairing the Dahla Dam
not only would fix the Afghans’ primary source for irrigation, but would also create
10,000 seasonal jobs. Canada pledged $50 million over three years to repair the Dahla
50 The United States was not pleased with Canada after it refused to join the international forces in the

overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and did not take part in the continental ballistic missile defense
initiative. By taking this highly important PRT, Canada not only could improve relations with the US, but
also prove to the international community that its military is still strong and capable as it had not
engaged in combat since the Korean War in 1953.
”The Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team: The Arm of Development in Kandahar Province,”
Kenneth Holland, American Review of Canadian Studies, Summer 2010, Vol. 40, Issue 2, p. 279‐280.
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Dam, focusing repair efforts on the water values, gates and canals, but also to finance
educational programs to teach the local farmers about water management and crop
growing techniques. 51 The Polio Eradication Project sought to immunize upwards of 7
million Afghan youth, 350,000 specifically in Kandahar, through an investment of $60
million over three years. Polio is most prevalent in the southern regions of Afghanistan,
and through targeting this region, Canada hopes to eliminate any traces of the disease
in three years. 52 The Education Signature Project invested $12 million over three years
to repair 50 Afghan schools and increase the function and mobility of the Afghan
Ministry of Education. With additional funding, or any funds leftover, Canada pledged to
build new schools. 53
Through these primary projects of the Canadian PRT in Kandahar, there have
been four overarching accomplishments of the Canadian mission: increased education
opportunities, increased economic opportunity, increased relations with civilians and
increased safety and detainment of insurgents. In addition to opening 13 new schools
and constructing an additional 20 schools, Canada has increased education
opportunities through opening the Kandahar Teacher Training College. This college was
established to ensure that all teachers were properly trained for the classroom, having
an immediate positive effect on the Afghan children. Canada also increased vocational
education, through training and educating over 150,000 Afghans in mine risks and
safety as well as an additional 2,000 Afghans in vocational and skills training. 54

51 Ibid, p. 282.
52 Ibid, p. 282.
53 Ibid, p. 281‐283
54 Ibid, p. 286.
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The Canadians have bettered relations with local Afghans in Kandahar, evident
as civilians no longer are throwing stones at Canadian operatives and are cooperating
with the Canadian mission. This is revealed clearly with the reporting of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), as 70‐90% of all IEDs turned‐in or reported are from Afghan
civilians. 55 The renovation of the Kajaki Dam on the Helmand River has begun to
provide flowing water to farmers, enabling individuals to grow stable crops and
agriculture. To increase ability to purchase and finance farming operations, 500
microfinance loans have been given to Afghan clients from Canada. Lastly, increased
civilian security has been provided through the reconstruction of the Sarposa Prison.
The Taliban raided this prison on June 13, 2008, freeing 1,200 prisoners, 1/3 of which
were Taliban fighters. Renovating this prison and beginning a police‐mentoring
program with active Canadian police officers have directly resulted in increased
security and detainment of insurgents. 56
Since the initial creation of PRTs, stark differences in management and operation
by the leading nation have emerged, leading scholars to refer to PRTs as following the
American Model, German Model or the British Model. While the explanations of PRT
models of operation are incredibly different, comparing and contrasting the
effectiveness among the models is near impossible to do and will be explained later in
the chapter.
The American Model uses less than 100 personnel, stresses force protection and
primarily finances quick impact projects. The US also prefers to create and control PRTs
primarily in the east and south of Afghanistan where the Taliban and insurgents are
55 Ibid, p. 285.
56 Ibid, p. 284.
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densely populated. The US has built and still controls PRTs in Asadabad, Khowst, Ghazni
and Qalat, provinces in the east and south of Afghanistan where it could easily operate
and create bases to target the Taliban and insurgents. 57 The US has been effective in
rapid‐reward programs, providing contractors and money for small and quick
reconstruction and development projects, but the overuse of —and often over emphasis
on—the military has drawn criticism. The US PRTs’ focus on military operations has
overlooked the role of the local community and governing body, through not including
them in development discussions and excluding the Afghan voice from provincial‐level
reconstruction. This combat‐stabilization model has come to define US PRT practices,
further expanding poor development policy. Through rogue military operations, the US
has not isolated the insurgents the ways conducive to military success. While the
innocent Afghan civilians are provided short‐term fixes of food, safety and electricity,
sustainable long‐term development projects are passed on in favor of military
operations. To garner the support of the Afghan people and increase the capacity of the
Afghan government at the local and federal levels, it is imperative to give them a role
and say in development practices, directly legitimizing the US‐led efforts to rebuilt
Afghanistan. Not including the local population in projects and overlooking
development projects have also had negative consequences in strengthening the so‐
called “power brokers” of Afghanistan. 58 With a primary focus on military operations,
the US has formed relationships with regional militias, supplying them with both

57 Ibid, p. 278.
58 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,” Markus Gauster,” George C. Marshall European
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weapons and money. These alliances with militias and power brokers directly weaken
the power of the Afghan‐controlled ANA.
The German PRT Model utilizes more than 300 personnel, stressing a strict
separation between military and civilian projects with separate civilian and military
bases. The German’s stressed this separation to reveal a relaxed security environment
so the local Afghans who need assistance from their PRTs would feel welcome and safe.
The German PRTs are focused on three primary areas: diplomacy, security and
development, in that order. 59 These foci distinguish the German model from that of the
US, as the German PRT model is not focused on counter‐insurgency tactics, but rather
on stabilization and reconstruction that will result in short and long‐term development.
However, self‐imposed restraints by the German government have limited German
PRTs from achieving full effectiveness in development projects. The massive
bureaucracy of the German government often leads to indecisiveness and caution,
leaving rapid decision‐making to perish. 60 While bureaucracy limits speed and
efficiency, the German PRT Model has been effective in increasing relations with the
Afghans and increasing Afghan rule of law particularly through the Kunduz PRT where
Germany has instituted a joint civil‐military command, where the German Foreign
Minister appoints the civilian head. This method allows development and diplomacy
matters to be handled by a foreign policy expert, and security and counter narcotics
issues to be handled by a military expert. 61

59 “PRT Models in Afghanistan: Approaches to Civil‐Military Integration,” Oskari Eronen, Crisis
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60 Ibid, p. 24‐28.
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The British Model practices with over 100 personnel per PRT to stress Security
Sector Reform (SSR). The UK sees PRTs as a civil‐military instrument, which through
development and reconstruction could strengthen the GIRoA. 62 The British PRTs
followed the five pillars of the SRR, which through targeting the general security
situation would yield positive end results. 63 The British believed that stressing security
would “defuse confrontations between rival warlords.” 64 However, the British focus on
defusing conflicts between power brokers has had an adverse effect, often
strengthening the position of influential power brokers. These power brokers have
begun to enter into the Afghan government while still maintaining a military arm of
their operation. Power brokers have used this military arm to either integrate into the
ANA and gain a powerful role in the state military apparatus, or have dissolved the
military arm in return for a powerful political position. The Afghan power brokers have
exploited this situation to use their current regional influence to gain increased power
at the national level. 65 This concern is prevalent not only in British‐operated PRTs, but
throughout Afghanistan, and is a major issue that needs to be addressed in the future
development of sustainable government reform.
62 “PRT Models in Afghanistan: Approaches to Civil‐Military Integration,” Oskari Eronen, Crisis

Management Centre Finland, Vol. 1, No. 5, 2008, p. 20‐22.
63 The five pillars of SSR reform were established in April 2002 at a security donors conference in
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Two of the more recent PRTs, Panjshir and Kala Gush, both controlled by the
United States—created in October of 2005 and November of 2006, respectively—
represent a unique change in US PRT operating style. While both still operate in the
security‐first mantra, the Panjshir PRT was the first and only civilian‐led US‐PRT. The
full list of operating PRTs is below, including location, opening date and the current
nation leading the PRT.
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Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Chronological Order) 66
PRT

Provinces
Covered

Region

Opening
Date

Creating
Nation

Current Lead
Nation

1. Gardez

Paktia, Lowgar

East

Jan 2003

U.S.

U.S.

2. Kunduz

Kunduz, Takhar

North

Mar 2003

U.S.

Germany (2003)

3. Bamian

Bamian

East

Mar 2003

U.S.

4. Mazar‐e Sharif

North

July 2003

UK

5. Bagram
6. Herat
7. Jalalabad
8. Kandahar

Balkh, Sar‐e Pol,
Jawzjan,
Samangan
Parwan, Kapisa
Herat
Nangarhar
Kandahar

New Zealand
(2003)
Sweden (2006)

East
West
East
South

Nov 2003
Dec 2003
Dec 2003
Dec 2003

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

U.S.
Italy (2005)
U.S.
Canada (2005)

9. Asadabad
10. Khowst
11. Ghazni
12. Qalat
13. Feyzabad

Kunar
Khowst
Ghazni
Zabul
Badakhshan

East
East
East
South
North

Feb 2004
Mar 2004
Mar 2004
Apr 2004
Jul 2004

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Germany

14. Meymaneh

Faryab

North

Jul 2004

UK

Norway (2005)

15. Lashkar Gah

Helmand

South

Sep 2004

U.S.

UK (2006)

16. Farah
17. Sharan
18. Tarin Kowt

Farah
Paktika
Uruzgan

West
East
South

Sep 2004
Sep 2004
Sep 2004

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

19. Pol‐e‐Khomri

Baghlan

North

Oct 2004

Netherlands

U.S.
U.S.
Netherlands
(2006)
Hungary (2006)

20. Mehtarlam

Langham

East

Apr 2005

U.S.

21. Qala‐i‐Naw

Badghis

West

Jul 2005

Spain

22. Chaghcharan

Ghowr

West

Aug 2005

Lithuania

Lithuania

23. Panjshir

Panjshir

East

Oct 2005

U.S.

U.S.

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Germany

U.S.
Spain
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24. Kala Gush
25. Vardak
26. Lowgar

Nurestan
Vardak
Lowgar

East
East
East

Nov 2006
Nov 2006
Mar 2008

U.S.
Turkey
Czech
Republic

U.S.
Turkey
Czech Republic

PRTs are operating across the entire country of Afghanistan, but are led by a
variety of nations, raising concerns as to the overall effectiveness and cohesion of PRTs.
As Markus Gauster notes,
The insurgency is multifaceted, but the efforts to fight it seem to be even
more diverse. Each PRT has a different set of goals and caveats and
different perceptions of success… The problem is that each nation and
each command has incentives to proclaim that its approach is uniquely
effective, and that there is very little in the way of objective evaluation of
results. 67
With 14 countries currently leading PRTs in three very different operational
approaches, it is incredibly difficult to facilitate cohesion between PRTs and its leading
country. That is, with different programs and focuses, success not only is defined
differently from country‐to‐country, but PRTs have the ability to affect one another,
both positively and negatively due to these differences in leadership and operational
approach.
The Senlis Council Security and Development Policy Group of London created a
system for measuring provincial security in 2006, and in 2007 created a table
designating a security level for each of the provinces in which a PRT is present. This
study allows a clear estimation of security in each PRT, revealing an efficiency
comparison across the three PRT models.
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Instability Scale for PRTs 68
Level
10
9

8

7

6

5

4

3
2
1

Characteristics
Open War: Evacuation of PRT personnel
War Zone (A): Situation similar to civil war; daily guerrilla attacks
on local civilians, police and internationals; combat operations of
OEF/ ISAF against MOF on a daily basis; provision of humanitarian
aid impossible
War Zone (B): Civil war tendencies; systematic attacks on local
civilians, local police and internationals; increased combat
operations of ISAF and OEF against MOF; political motivated
violence; massive alienation between local population and GoA;
security in the PRT complex only guaranteed by outside support;
ordinary PRT‐patrolling not possible; population in rural areas
depends on the opium crop; PRT or NGO induced development
cooperation not feasible
Transition from PostConflict into War Zone: Areas of high risk;
increased attacks on local officials, police stations, international
forces including PRTs; population consult Taliban Shuras for legal
advice; reconstruction projects cannot be carried out without
protection element; very few NGOs operating; ordinary PRT‐patrols
(“showing the flag”) with light armament very restricted
Instability: Targeted violence and threats of violence against
civilians and members of the military; illegal road blocks; danger of
hijackings; cross‐country trips without a convoy very dangerous;
some NGOs operating; realization of aid projects very difficult;
attacks on PRTs e.g. during violent demonstrations
Not Calm and Not Stable: Scattered attacks and threats of violence
against government representatives and international forces; attacks
on election candidates; increase of violent crimes; organized anti‐
government demonstrations can turn violent; movement only
advisable in convoy; Roadside Bombs and suicide attacks possible
Calm, but Not Stable: Hidden threats against, and intimidation of,
local population; anti‐GoA and anti‐Western propaganda; cultivation
of opium regarded as a generally tolerated source of income for the
population; massive corruption
Calm: Insufficient border control leads to increasing tendency
towards violent crimes in connection with illegal trade (drugs,
weapons, human trafficking)
Calm and Stable: Minor violent crime; government controls most of
the borders and key areas; civilian administration works;
development projects can be realized without security problems
Overall Stability: Governmental control of the whole area; increase
of legal activities

Provinces
None
Helmand,
Kandahar
Uruzgan, Zabul,
Khowst

Kunar, Paktya,
Paktika, Ghazni,
Nuristan

Nangarhar,
Laghman, Farah,
Faryab, Ghor,
Badghis, Wardak
Parwan, Kunduz,
Takhar,
Badakhshan, Heart,
Balkh
Bamyan, Jowzjan,
Sar‐e Pol,
Samangan,
Baghlan, Takhar
Nimruz
None
None

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,” Markus Gauster,” George C. Marshall European
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The majority of provinces with PRTs are still experiencing high levels of
insecurity and armed conflict. With all of the independent security and development
programs and projects being implemented around the country, it is difficult to deduce if
PRTs are achieving sustainable results. Out of the 10 provinces that received a security
level of 7 or above, the United States controls PRTs in 7 of the 10 provinces. Thus,
questions regarding the effectiveness of the US PRT Model with its security‐first
approach are unfair. As the US controls PRTs in the most dangerous provinces, it is
imperative to maintain a security‐first approach to quell the insurgency. The US does
not have the freedom or option to approach the violent and war zone provinces with a
model other than security‐first. Thus, comparisons across the three PRT Models are
impractical as each functions differently due to different safety environments, ethnic
breakdowns, regions, and degree of preexisting development and infrastructure. All
that can be done it to evaluate the success of programs and hope to learn from the
successes to avoid future challenges and setbacks.
PRTs are an important aspect in the development of Afghanistan, as each PRT
individually can achieve large goals with few resources. While each individual PRT has
its own accomplishments, the Provincial Reconstruction Team program as a whole does
have some serious flaws that need to be addressed. First, PRTs, while one of the largest
development programs in Afghanistan, need to serve as a supplementary program to
the central and local Afghan governments, to aid in development and state building
measures—they cannot replace state institutions. 69 PRTs can only be effective if they

69 In addition to shuras and loya jirgas, traditional governing bodies in Afghanistan, there are active

provincial‐level governing bodies in addition to Community Development Councils established by the
National Solidarity Program.
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give support to the local population and leadership—employing Afghan civilians and
companies and giving autonomy and power to Afghan institutions ensures effective
development. However, with 14 countries running independent PRTs with independent
goals and priorities, not all PRTs are giving equal priority to local ownership, thereby
jeopardizing the success of the province and country as a whole. The Afghan Ministry of
Finance specifically highlighted these concerns in 2009:
Most of the projects PRTS implement are planned and discussed at the
grassroots level with community elders, and do not involve views of the
central government. Although PRTS have actively participated in the
reconstruction of Afghanistan and implemented development and
humanitarian projects in some of the most difficult and remote areas,
there is a perception among Afghan people that most of the projects were
not aligned with the government priorities and plans, and have no
delivered sustainable results. 70
PRTs, while designed to provide short‐term progress and rapid relief programs, have
often overlooked the long‐term success of the province. Increased emphasis on the
short‐term does not correlate to proper long‐term state building and political success.
With these overarching principles, PRTs need to increase their roles in five key areas:
increasing the number of outposts to ensure a country‐wide presence, increasing local
ownership by shifting the focus to Afghan autonomy and leadership, increasing the
civilian presence in PRTS—thereby decreasing the amount of military personnel,
increasing the training of Afghan administrators, politicians and security forces to
70 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “Donor Financial Review” (2009), p. 13.
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increase state authority, and finally an increase in development projects in agriculture
and rule of law. 71

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP):
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) is a project of the US
Department of Defense with a broad goal of providing funds for small projects in areas
in need of humanitarian relief and reconstruction. The program was created while the
US was involved in military operations in Iraq in 2003.
While conducting raids and patrols in Baghdad, Soldiers of the 3rd
Infantry Division found a reported 1.2 billion dollars in American
currency that former Ba’ath and Republican Guard officials had hidden
away in various false walls and hidden containers. …
The U.S. Central Command determined the seized funds belonged
to the State of Iraq and were not the personal property of a select group
of its citizens… making the seized money available to coalition forces for
humanitarian assistance under the name Brigade Commander’s
Discretionary Recovery Program to Directly Benefit the Iraqi People…
The ensuing Coalition Provisional Authority subsequently renamed this
program the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). 72
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In order to receive funding, a CERP project must be a rapid relief program that
immediately assists the local population, in this case in Afghanistan. Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates described the use and goals of CERP in February 2007, “by
building trust and confidence in the coalition… these CERP projects increase the flow of
intelligence to commanders in the field and help turn local Iraqis and Afghans against
insurgents and terrorists.” 73 While Secretary Gates chose to focus on the military
objective of these projects, CERP projects and financing is also a means to allow the
quick allocation of finances to urgent projects all across Afghanistan. All of the funding
for CERP projects is channeled through the local Provincial Reconstruction Team. While
funneling all CERP finances through PRT programs seems like a waste of a program,
however establishing a separate program that allows for immediate distribution of
finances is imperative in local development. Most local projects will not require more
than $500,000 USD, and creating this separate entity allows for allocation of funding to
be streamlined through circumnavigating PRT bureaucracy.
Former US Under Secretary of Defense Tina W. Jonas highlighted the areas in
which CERP financing can be applied: water and sanitation; food production and
distribution; agriculture; electricity; healthcare; education; telecommunications;
economic, financial and management improvements; transportation; rule of law and
governance; irrigation; civic cleanup activities; civic support vehicles; repair of civic and
cultural facilities; repair, or payment for repair, of property damage that results from
US, coalition, or supporting military operations that is not compensable under the
Foreign Claims Act; condolence payments to individual civilians for the death or
73 “Buying Time in Afghanistan,” Carl Robichaud, World Policy Journal, Summer 2007, p. 5‐6.
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physical injury resulting from US, coalition, or supporting military operations, made to
the surviving spouse or next kin; payments to individuals upon release from detention;
protective measures, such as fencing, lights, barrier materials, berming over pipelines,
guard towers, etc.; and other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects. 74
While this list is quite substantive, the Under Secretary for Defense also
specifically outlined areas in which CERP financing was prohibited: direct or indirect
benefit to US, coalition, or supporting military personnel; providing goods, services, or
funds to any and all security forces; weapons buy‐back programs or purchasing or
firearms; entertainment; reward programs; removal of IEDs; duplication of services
available through municipal governments; salaries, bonuses or pensions of Afghan
military or government personnel; training, equipping or operating costs of Afghan
security forces; and conduction psychological operation, information operations or
other security force operations. 75
With specific guidelines for where funding can and cannot be spent, US
commanders in Afghanistan are in charge of the allocation of CERP resources.
Responsibilities in disbursing, executing and evaluating CERP projects is broken down
as follows:

74 “Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments: Commanders’ Emergency Response
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Roles and Responsibilities in CERP Projects 76
Brigade Commander

Responsible for the overall implementation of the CERP
within the brigade’s area of responsibility (AOR). The
BCT commander appoints Project Purchasing Officers
(PPOs) and Paying Agents (PAs). The Brigade
Commander identifies and approves projects within his
spending authority and ensures the proper
management, reporting, and fiscal controls are
established to account for CERP funds.

Battalion/Task Force Commander

Responsible for the overall implementation of the CERP
within the battalion. Battalion Commanders nominate
their designated PPO to manage battalion‐level projects
and PAs to make disbursements for project payments.
Battalion Commanders identify and approve projects
within his spending authority and ensures the proper
management, reporting, and fiscal controls are
established to account for CERP funds. Upon project
completion, the commander ensures the facility is
turned over to local authorities in accordance with
established policies.

Civilian Affairs Officers/S9 Staff

Develop plans and programs and recommend policies
to build the relationship between the unit and local civil
authorities. Provide advice on the prioritization of
allocated CERP funds. Conduct the daily management of
the unit CERP and oversight of the unit PPO. Facilitate
project coordination with other U.S. government
agencies, non‐governmental organizations,
international organizations, and regional organizations
operating within the unit AOR.

Staff Engineer

Offer engineering and technical capabilities to review
projects funded through the unit CERP.

Brigade Staff Judge Advocate

Review project nominations, investigate, and
recommend adjudication of civilian claims for battle
damage of personal property.

Project Payment Officer
Paying Agent

Manages the project budget and CERP project
nominations.
Responsible to receive and disburse cash payments for
CERP projects.

With relegation of responsibility falling primarily in the hands of US
Commanders, these individuals have the authorization to disburse up to $500,000 per
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project. In select cased where project costs exceed the $500,000 ceiling, US
commanders can appeal to the Commander of US Central Command, currently General
James Mattis, for increased spending authorization. 77 In order to receive funding, a
project must be selected. Once a project is found, a “letter of justification” must be
submitted to the General. If the project is preliminarily selected, an additional
“purchase request and commitment” form must be submitted followed by letters of
endorsement of the project from local officials. 78 Once all of the paperwork is submitted
and approved, the project begins to occur and the financing can be given to one of two
recipients, Afghan civilians or Afghan contractors. This measure was created to ensure
that Afghans take charge of their own development. 79 While the development is
occurring, individuals, as previously mentioned in the chart above, are in place to
monitor the projects and financing. However, additional steps are required to ensure
project efficiency and monitoring, including project coordination meetings, where all
involved members meet to discuss the progress of each individual CERP project, a
mechanism designed to ensure project success.
CERP was created in 2004 and since its inception has disbursed $1.24 billion as
of June 30, 2010. Over the same time period CERP has appropriated $2.64 billion from
the US DoD, meaning the program was only able to spend 47% of its allocated resources
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on these “urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements.” 80 With low
utilization of funds, CERP has fallen victim to issues similar to other development
programs in failing to utilize all appropriated funds. Critiques and evaluations of CERP
center around inefficiencies and failures to address long‐term development issues. A
report by the Center for Global Development noted that CERP is a highly decentralized
program, is highly dependent on the judgment of one commander, and is occasionally
vulnerable to fraud and abuse. The report also critiqued the short‐term focus of CERP
programs, missing an opportunity to “lay the foundations for accountable governance
and sustainable development… the United States could improve its long‐term
effectiveness by involving governance and development professionals from USAID and
the State Department in the design of specific CERP projects and in the evaluation of
CERP impacts on security, political stability and economic recovery.” 81
Other critiques of the CERP program note an insufficient monitoring system and
minimal financial oversight, which allows little tracking of how CERP financing is
spent. 82 However, the project goals to have Afghans take charge of their countries
development should be noted as a project success. As CERP makes changes to address
project management and long‐term efficiency Afghans will increase their role in
involvement in the development of the country.
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Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP):
The Afghanistan Social Outreach Program was created in 2008 by the IDLG
(Independent Directorate of Local Governance), a body created in 2007 to supervise
governance at the provincial level. The program aims to build local governance through
setting up district councils in districts that have been identified as “strategically
important.” 83 Once formed, the members of these district councils can receive financial
compensation from the US government for cooperating against the insurgency and
ridding the district of insurgents. To achieve this rather substantial task of separating a
district from the insurgency is quite difficult and ASOPs work collectively with the ISAF,
USAID, district governors and Afghan government officials to rid the district of
insurgents. 84 This collective process helps to later develop District Delivery Programs
(DDP).
ASOPs are reportedly active in the Nawa district of the Helmand province and in
the Baraki‐Barak district of the Lowgar province. While there are only two reported
active ASOPs, the US has announced that it will expand ASOPs to 100 districts in the
next two years, as of late 2009. 85 In a report from the Office of the Special
Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan in February 2010, it was noted that ASOPs
“bridge the gap between communities and district authorities through the creation of
temporary district‐level shuras, the establishment of local community councils, and
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performance‐based funds for governors.” 86 The district level councils, or shuras, help to
bind the formal and informal systems to solve district‐level problems within
Afghanistan. Establishing district councils is imperative to the long‐term development
of Afghanistan. Not only does it provide the means at the local level to provide the
needs of Afghan citizens, but also at the larger level it provides the framework for
provincial‐level government to strengthen the arms of the central Afghan government.
The ASOP in Helmand province has increased provincial governance through
bringing together the district governor, prosecutor and local elders—all through local
elections. The combination of the above individuals has combined the formal
(government) and informal (local elders) to work collectively to solve district‐wide
issues. This combination of the formal and informal is imperative in ASOPs because it
“combines the legality of state rule with the legitimacy of local elders.” 87
While ASOPs have been active and again nurture a bond between elected state
officials and local elders, there are some fundamental flaws with the program. This
combination of elders working with elected officials of local and state government
creates a system driven by personal relationships, making it increasingly difficult to
sustain as officials are rotated through each ASOP. 88 Another major problem with the
ASOP is the lack of citizen and civilian participation. Particularly at the district level it is
imperative to garner the support of the local population, as it further supports the state
governing system, directly isolating the insurgency. Appointments to ASOP district
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councils are elected, but still are subject to approval by either the provincial governor
or the IDLG, both of whom are non‐elected officials. 89 It is counterproductive to push a
program of rule of law and state governance when the population at large still has no
say or voice in politics, even at the local level. However, even with these concerns
ASOPs still lay the foundation to create district and provincial level governing bodies
which, when functioning effectively, will be the local bodies of the Afghan government
which can report to Kabul and to the federal government and create the structure of a
modern democracy.

District Delivery Programs (DDP):
District Delivery Programs are district‐level development plans created by ASOP
councils, district governors and international military and civilian advisors. Local
Afghan ministries run these programs to rapidly increase government development and
aid in districts cleared of the insurgency. 90 DDPs are not meant to replace development
programs in a given district, but rather supplement those projects to improve
government capacity at the local level. DDPs deliver services from the GIRoA through
the DDP in order to empower local governments. DDPs were originally piloted in the
districts below, but are scheduled to be active in 80 key districts, where nearly 70% of
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the Afghan population resides, to garner the outright support of the Afghan populace
for the GIRoA.

DDP Proposed Roadmap (AprilJune 2010) 91
April 2010
Sayyedibad
(Wardak Province)
Baraki Barak
(Logar Province)

May 2010
Nawa
(Helmand Province)
Nahr‐e‐Saraj
(Helmand Province)

June 2010
Surkh Rod
(Nangarhar Province)
Khogyani
(Nangahar Province)

Beshud
(Nanagarhar Province)
Kandahar

Qarghah’I
(Lagman Province)

These programs are again set‐up in post‐conflict, insurgency‐ridden districts,
often resulting from successful ASOPs. Once active, DDPs focus on two primary goals:
(1) delivering services to the people and (2) ensuring that these services are provided
through a consultative process with the Provincial Governor and District Governors and
any involved Ministries. 92
The DDPs are a relatively new program, the effectiveness of which is yet to be
fully understood. As the DDPs expand to 80 major districts a true evaluation can be
completed. However, similar to the ASOP, DDPs need to ensure that Kabul is in fact
supplementing ongoing projects and not undermining the power and authority of the
local district councils. DDPs are put in place once the insurgency has been ridden from a
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district to ensure the insurgency does not return and to gain popular support for the
GIRoA and local district councils. Thus, DDPs need to be instituted effectively, provide
for the local population, give that population a voice in politics, and not undermine the
expansion and growth of the district councils.

Economic Support Fund (ESF):
The Economic Support Fund is a program run by USAID to support both short
and long‐term economic, political and security needs all over the world, and in this case,
Afghanistan. By using funding to support counterterrorism activities, local economies
and legal systems, the ESF hopes to create a more transparent and accountable Afghan
government. 93 EFS funding is primarily used to fund PRT projects, but has the ability to
operate independently. As of March 2010, the ESF has been allocated $9.74 billion. Of
the allocated funds, only $5.39 billion has been disbursed, utilizing only 55.3% of
allocated funds. This poor percentage of disbursement versus allocation is a constant
issue in development programs, but more revealing is what contractors are receiving
ESF funding.
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ESF Funds by Contractor 94
Contractor

Percentage

Domestic U.S. Contractors

69.56%

International Organizations

26.20%

Non‐U.S. and Non‐Afghan Contractors

1.95%

U.S. Government

1.24%

GIRoA Ministries

0.84%

Local Afghan Contractors

0.21%

Total

100%

99% of ESF contracts are being given to US and international contractors for
development work in Afghanistan. This is a major dichotomy in the development of
Afghanistan, as the funding that it to be used to develop Afghanistan is rather being
invested back into the donor nations. The ESF cannot preach development of the Afghan
state when its finances are being invested outside of Afghanistan. Further, the people
that need to be responsible for the rebuilding and maintaining of the Afghan state are
Afghan. Afghans cannot be held responsible for the long‐term development of their
country when money is not being invested through the state. ESF must increase funding
to Afghan contractors and ministries to spur the Afghan economy and increase future
Afghan self‐sufficiency.
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Military Aid
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF):
The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund is a program run by the US Department of
Defense to equip and train the Afghanistan National Security Forces. ASFF funding is
also utilized to construct and renovate military facilities, with specific construction
projects including the Afghan Ministry of Interior’s National Logistics Center and the
Ministry of Interior’s Transportation Battalion. 95 With this military funding source in
place since 2005, $25.23 billion has been made available of which $20.79 billion has
been disbursed. 96 Appropriations of the ASFF represent 49% of all US reconstruction
assistance to Afghanistan. With such high appropriations, the ASFF has been able to
spent 82.4% of allocated funds, an incredibly high rate compared to non‐military
development programs.
Available funds in the ASFF can be utilized in one of three areas: Defense Forces,
Interior Forces, and Related Activities. Defense Forces funds are used to fund ANA
activities, Interior Forces funds are used to fund ANP activities, and Related Activities
fund detainee operations. The breakdown of allocation of funds between the three
branches can be seen in the table below:
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ASFF Disbursement by Group 97
Branch
1. Defense Forces (ANA)
a. Equipment and Transportation
b. Sustainment
c. Infrastructure
d. Training and Operations
2. Interior Forces (ANP)
a. Equipment and Transportation
b. Sustainment
c. Infrastructure
d. Training and Operations
3. Related Activities
a. Detainee Operations
Total

Disbursement
(US$, billion)
$13.62
$6.25
$3.69
$2.48
$1.21
$7.08
$1.94
$1.92
$1.59
$1.63
$0.09
$0.09
$20.79

Percentage
65.5%

34.1%

0.4%
100%

To increase oversight over the ASFF, US Congress took two major steps to
increase financial oversight and project evaluations. The first, in November of 2009,
came after a US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that called for the
creation of a Deputy Commanding General of Programs. This new position would be
held by a one‐star deputy general to oversee CSTC‐A use of ASFF funding (more details
on CSTC‐A program follow in next section). This position has been assigned and active
since 2009, with further responsibilities including broad oversight of the execution of
the ASFF budget. 98 The second major step taken was in December 2009, when 26
positions were identified in a report as high priority and needing to be created
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immediately. Currently, 16 of the 26 positions have been filled, 9 have given start dates
in the future, and only 1 position is under administration review. 99
These changes in logistics have allowed the ASFF to shift from using “infantry‐
centric forces to additional enablers like combat support, logistics, route clearance,
military police and military intelligence, directly decreasing dependence on military
assistance from international partners.” 100 These results correlate to the increase of
current troop levels of 171,600 in the ANA and 134,000 in the ANP as of October
2010. 101 Future targets, set during the London Conference of 2010, aim to have 240,000
active soldiers in the ANA by 2014. 102 ASFF has contributed to the construction of 88
ANP district headquarters, as well as 7 border police facilities. 103
However, with these physical achievements there are still concerns regarding
the efficiency of the ASFF and the overall success of the programs the ASFF aims to
build: the ANA and ANP. Concerns about the ASFF center primarily around corruption,
lack of training, and ethnic issues. On a macro level, a US solider in Afghanistan may
have summed it up most accurately, as he described Afghan soldiers as “armed,
uninformed and unprepared.” 104 This critique follows a major criticism of funding for
the ANSF, that US desires for having soldiers solely based on quantity trumps quality
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control issues of training and literacy. This issue is mirrored in the belief that the ASFF
focuses too strongly on issues of arming and training soldiers and overlooks the bigger
picture issues of accountability in the GIRoA.
Training and equipping the Afghan army is crucial to the overall
counterinsurgency effort, the international community and the Afghan
government should invest more in establishing greater accountability.
More efforts should be made to recruit and retain experienced Afghan
civilian administrators in the MOD. Kabul should also reform legal and
administrative structures to counter virulent internal factionalism. 105
Focusing back on micro issues, corruption concerns have been prevalent in all facets of
military reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. A recent GAO report in January 2009
found that the ANSF could not account for thousands of missing weapons. In 2007,
ANSF received 55,000 M‐16’s from the United States, but only 32,000 were fielded in
2009. 106 This concern raises questions about fraud and corruption, but also brings to
light a major issue of illiteracy among ANSF soldiers. As of 2009, the GAO reported that
1 in 4 ANA soldiers is both illiterate and cannot operate automated systems, making
electronic accountability impossible. 107 Illiteracy issues also carry over into concerns
about the overall training of the ANA. Reports indicate that 70% of the ANA is illiterate
and drug addiction may be as high at 80‐85% in the ANA. 108 With such poor emphasis
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on literacy training, development and discipline, it is incredibly difficult for the 171,600
soldier‐strong ANA to be an independent functioning body.
Ethnic issues are also prevalent in the ANSF, with strong ethnic representation
among soldiers in the ANSF:

Ethnic Breakdown of ANSF Soldiers 109
Ethnicity

Percentage of the ANSF

Pashtun

44%

Tajik

25%

Hazara

10%

Uzbek

8%

Other

11%

Total

100%

Thus, at 25% of the ANSF, the Tajiks have disproportionate representation in the
ANSF, comprising 40.98% of all security forces. Even more shocking is that 90 of the
first 100 commissioned Generals in Afghanistan were of Tajik ethnicity and were all
from the Panjshir Valley. This places Tajiks as a disproportionate majority of the ANSF,
and while this is not a slight to the skill, patriotism or pride of the Tajiks, it does raise
questions about outside influence. As the US, Germany and UK oversee all military
training operations, it does raise the question of whether or not Tajik favoritism is
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taking place. The US and NATO‐allied nations did partner with the Northern Alliance to
topple the Taliban in 2001, and the Northern Alliance has strong Tajik representation
densely concentrated in the Panjshir Valley. 110
Even with these concerns about the ASFF and the training and operation of the
ANSF, the ASFF has yielded clear positive results. Troop numbers in the ANSF have
increased faster than anticipated and are on target to reach 240,000 by 2014. The
dropout rate of soldiers in the Basic Warrior Training program has declined to 16%.
The application rate has risen for positions at the Kabul Military Training Center
(KMTC), which is now receiving 3,000 applications for 400 KMTC positions. 111 Average
monthly salaries for ANSF have risen as well, paying an average of $100‐$110 per
month versus the monthly salary of $16 from the AMF.
With mixed views as to the success of the ASFF, and in broader context the ANSF,
it is indisputable that a greater emphasis needs to be placed on funding literacy training
and development programs. More money needs to be allocated in larger‐picture
institutions of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to increase
capacity building skills of the central Afghan government, so the ANSF can be monitored
and organized by the GIRoA, independent of international military assistance and
oversight.
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Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTCA):
The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan was effectively
created in 2005, evolving out of the former Office of Security Cooperation – Afghanistan
(OSC‐A) program. In 2005 the United States greatly increased its funding to OSC‐A, and
with this influx of finance came increased responsibilities, yielding a new program, the
CSTC‐A, to be the main multinational military provider of training and equipping the
ANSF. 112 The overarching goal of CSTC‐A is to create an ANSF that provides security
within Afghanistan. To do so, CSTC‐A works multilaterally to advise, mentor and train
the Afghan Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defense. These activities primarily
include arming and training the ANA, ANP, ANBP, and ANCOP. 113
Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell is the current Commanding General of
the CSTC‐A, having succeeded Major General Richard P. Formica, and before him Major
General Richard W. Cone. CSTC‐A is based in the heart of Afghanistan at Camp Eggers in
Kabul. From this base, the majority of tasks are carried out by Task Force Phoenix,
through authorization by US Central Command (CENTCOM). In this role, the CSTC‐A has
been responsible for the overall training, arming and practice of the ANSF, having
guided the ANSF to its current ranks and size.
As of February 2010 the CSTC‐A experienced a shift in role and “was
subordinated to the broader NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM‐A)… CSTC‐A’s
mission was reoriented to building the capacity of the Afghan Defense and Interior
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Ministries, and to provide resources to the ANSF.” 114 With the change in role, the
number of required staff was set to 4,800 personnel. While current staffing levels are
below the target, General David Petraeus has received pledges from other countries to
fill the staffing void.
Since the program’s inception in 2005 and recent transition in role in 2010,
there have been many clear achievements. Former CSTC‐A Commanding General, Major
General Robert W. Cone, received the Ghazi Wazir Mohammad Akbar Khan State Medal
from President Hamid Karzai in 2008 for his development and strengthening of the
Afghan National Army. Under General Cone’s guidance, the CSTC‐A was effective in
expanding the ANA to 26,000 soldiers, a growth rate of over three‐times the previous
enrollment. An ANP training program was established, which has since trained over
22,000 policemen. And lastly, the Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) was also a
target of CSTC‐A training and now currently flies 90% of all air missions. 115 Increased
arming and training measures, including refurbishing military equipment, has been an
effective program for cutting costs, while training ANSF members in engineering. In
December 2008, CSTC‐A engineers refurbished 6 Mi‐17 cargo helicopters for the ANA,
helping train the ANAAC on how to fly and repair machinery. 116 Another achievement
has come in the area that has been at the forefront of corruption woes, weapons
accountability. Keeping track of weapon numbers, tracking where weapons are coming
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from, and tracking where weapons are assigned have always been a source of confusion
from 2002‐2007, as the ANSF only counted numbers of weapons and no additional
information. Now, the ANSF utilizes a CSTC‐A program that scans serial numbers on
weapons and reports weapons tracking numbers to the Afghan Ministry of Defense in
monthly reports. During a recent random weapons inspection by the CSTC‐A, at the
request of the US Government Accountability Office, the CSTC‐A found that 296 of 330
weapons were accounted for, totaling roughly 90%. 117
However, even with these achievements and increases in trained ANSF
personnel, there are still major concerns regarding the CSTC‐A program. The program
as a whole has been stretched to its limits in terms of effective training and equipping.
Constant problems with training soldiers, faulty equipment, slow infrastructure
development, and poor army attrition rates have led to the CSTC‐A exhausting its
resources. 118 A 2009 US Department of Defense report found that these problems “have
stretched CSTC‐A’s current train and equip system to the edge of acceptable limits and
has jeopardized the army’s force quality and long‐term viability.” 119
With concerns about overstretching the capabilities of the CSTC‐A, further
resource constraints have limited CSTC‐A involvement and training of provincial and
local police commanders. Poor weapons management has decreased amid the CSTC‐A
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weapons management system, put in place in 2007 after the M‐16 fiasco. 120 The high
use of international contractors has decreased the accountability of the CSTC‐A, as there
is little oversight and scrutiny of contractors and their work. 121 At the bureaucratic
level, CSTC‐A has endured a power struggle with ANA and Afghan Ministry of Defense
officials. While the CSTC‐A wants to establish an infrastructure system based in Kabul
with branches extending to the provinces, many ANA and MoD officials have resisted
this change as it directly decreases their power and influence. 122 Therefore, there is an
immediate need to work with the Afghan people to strengthen and legitimize
administrative structures within the Afghan central government.
As the CSTC‐A has just recently shifted its focus to increasing the power and
function of the Afghan MoD and other national security institutions, increased emphasis
needs to continue to be focused on dissolving factional, warlord power through
increasing Afghan accountability and management of its ANSF. The CSTC‐A has
succeeded in its previous role of building a functioning and active ANSF, as the ANA is
currently staffed with 171,600 soldiers and the ANP with 134,000 policemen. These
programs were built essentially from scratch, and the CSTC‐A has more than achieved
its goal in just five years. Accountability, training, and reorienting a strong, central
government need to be the focus in the coming months and years, and five years of a
short‐term rapid increase of ANSF personnel needs to be met with another five years of
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long‐term law and order reform in order to ensure the success of CSTC‐A programs in
the ANSF.

Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and CounterDrug Activities (DoD CN):
The US Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter‐Drug Activities
program was put to work in Afghanistan in 2004 to combat its abundant drug‐related
activities. Drug‐related activities became a focus of the United States’ military and
development operations as drug production and trade often financed insurgency
operations. The Taliban has been known to receive funding through the taxing of drug
trade and cooperation with the Pakistani ISI in smuggling drugs across the Afghanistan‐
Pakistan border. The money from taxing the production and sale of opium has directly
financed the Taliban and other insurgency groups. Thus, combating these operations,
while strengthening the authority of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and ANBP, is a
necessity in building state capacity.
To combat Afghan drug activities, the DoD CN uses funding to support military
operations (both by the US and Afghan forces) against drug activities, support Afghan
counternarcotics programs, and train and equip Afghan counternarcotics enforcement
branches. 123 To fund these programs, the US Department of Defense has allocated $1.43
billion since 2004, $1.40 billion of which has been disbursed. Over the past 6 years,
nearly 98% of all allocated funding has been spent on counternarcotics activities, a
higher percentage than all development programs in Afghanistan. 124
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Specific DoD CN funding has been spent in four main areas: Military Action,
Public Information Support, Law Enforcement, and Interdiction Efforts. 125 Military
action spending includes financing US military operations on drug trafficking targets
including the use of Apache, Blackhawk and MI‐8 helicopter attacks. This branch also
includes supporting Afghan military counternarcotics operations. Public Information
Support focuses on developing an Afghan public affairs office that announces
counternarcotics achievements at the local and international levels, to garner support
for the GIRoA and deter insurgency popularity. Law Enforcement spending is primarily
used to equip the Afghan Border Police and Highway Police, the primary Afghan
security bodies that deal with drug trafficking issues. “Border Police operate in an often
hostile environment where heavily armed traffickers or militants are found, and they
often need equipment beyond the requirements of normal policemen—equipment such
as vests and cold/wet weather gear.” 126
Interdiction efforts have focused funding and operations on working with
Afghanistan’s neighbors and establishing Intelligence Fusion Centers (IFCs), shared
counter‐narcoterrorism intelligence centers under the control of the Afghan Ministry of
Interior. 127 US counternarcotics work at the regional level has involved cooperation
with Russia and the Gulf States. Russia recently agreed to the Bilateral Presidential
Commission with the US, a joint program “to stem regional drug flows, promote
information exchange on threat finance, and reduce demand for heroin that sustains the
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Afghanistan drug trade.” 128 The Gulf States, with their massive financial market, have
been targeted by the DoD CN to use their financing capabilities as a threat to
international drug traffickers who often look to the Gulf region for funding. 129
With this broad range of counternarcotics activities through the DoD CN and
other drug interdiction programs, questions still remain as to how successful
counternarcotics operations have been. Even as drug fields are torched, drugs are
seized and traffickers are arrested, many involved in drug activities often continue their
involvement because there is no other alternative for work outside of opium
production. Afghans involved in drug activities need an alternative source of income
and security to avoid the temptation of drug production. The DoD CN should not only
focus on eradication, but also on creating jobs to facilitate the growth of an alternative
economy. 130

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE):
The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement program is a joint
partnership between the US Department of State (under the International Narcotics &
Law Enforcement Affairs division) and Department of Defense. INCLE funds and
operates programs within a foreign nation, be it foreign police or counternarcotics, to
advance the rule of law and combat narcotics production. INCLE programs are designed
to impact the international drug trade through “strengthening foreign government
128 “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,” Office of the Special Representative for
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ability to identify, confront and disrupt the operations.” 131 This counternarcotics‐driven
program is structurally and fundamentally different from other programs as there is
minimal US or outside influence and leadership. International contractors and US police
officers are used through INCLE to train the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
(CNPA). INCLE serves to increase the function and capability of Afghan rule of law,
while not rendering the Afghan government branches ineffective. To achieve this
objective INCLE has a two‐pronged approach: disrupting the overseas production and
trafficking of illicit drugs; and developing stable criminal justice systems to strengthen
law enforcement and judicial effectiveness. 132
Since INCLE was established in Afghanistan in 2004, it has been allotted $2.68
billion of which $1.68 billion has been used. 133 This results in a 63% use of available
funds. While that percentage is not as high as other programs, INCLE has made great
strides in spending its money and investing its money in Afghan contactors and sources.
This represents a stark contrast to the ESF and other development programs, which
overwhelmingly invest finances back into the pockets of American contractors.
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INCLE Fund Allocation 134
Funding Source

Percentage

Afghan Contractors

68%

GIRoA Ministries

20%

International Organizations

7%

US Government Organizations

3%

US‐based NGOs

2%

Total

100%

Nearly 90% of all INCLE funding, roughly $1.5 billion, has been invested in Afghanistan,
whether through the Afghan government or Afghan contractors. This represents two
clear positives of the INCLE program. One, INCLE is again assisting in, not controlling,
the development of the Afghan state and operating with various Afghan Ministries.
Second, INCLE is investing its funds into the success of the Afghan state. $1.68 billion US
dollars can go very far in a poor country like Afghanistan, and this money directly
stimulates and grows a feeble economy in need of investment. It is difficult to track
specific INCLE fund spending as INCLE supports INL programs which receive funding
from INCLE, US DoS and US DoD. Dennis Keller, retired US Army Colonel, elaborates on
this accounting dilemma as “it is difficult to determine how many U.S. Police are

134 Ibid, p. 50.

87

contracted by ICITA with INCLE funds provided by DoS INL, and how many are actually
contracted by INL/CIV itself using INCLE funds.” 135
While tracking funding is difficult, the White House Office of Management and
Budget was able to give the INCLE program a rating of “Adequate.” 136 This score reflects
problems areas of a lack of resources to oversee financial management and lack of
clarity if current counternarcotics programs will achieve the most cost efficient
results. 137 However, INCLE is working to address those concerns by hiring new staff to
oversee all financial management as well as analyze the current INCLE strategy to
assure that all resources are devoted to projects with the highest upside.
The format and function of INCLE is one that should be closely analyzed to see if
programs that highly support and invest in the Afghan state should be adopted by other
development programs. As INCLE adapts to new changes, it still faces an uphill battle in
rooting out drug‐related activities in Afghanistan. Afghanistan ranked 179 out of 180
countries in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perception Index. While
there is clear political corruption present, a great deal of this corruption arises from
non‐monitored border crossings that allows for the free flow of drug trade. INCLE has
begun to focus on this issue, as by 2008 INCLE assisted in Afghan government control of
14 official border crossings. While there are over 1,000 unofficial border crossings,
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INCLE has addressed this issue as a focus of the counternarcotics program. 138 With
INCLE continuing to act in an assisting role and invest in Afghanistan, positive change
should continue in the capabilities of the CNPA and ANBP as well as at the Ministerial
level in Afghanistan.
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Chapter 4: Afghan GovernmentManaged Aid
Introduction
Afghan government managed aid comprises 23%, a distinct minority, of
international aid in Afghanistan. With only $8.691 billion being controlled by the
Afghan government, it is increasingly difficult to hold the GIRoA responsible for the
development of Afghanistan. Even with a significantly lower percentage of funds,
Afghan managed aid has been allocated in two manners: through trust funds and direct
budget support. The three major trust funds in Afghanistan are the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan
(LOFTA), and the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF). There are two primary means
of providing budget support: providing general budget support, both discretionary and
non‐discretionary, and through US Department of Defense recurrent budget support.
Direct budget support is very difficult to track as it is appropriated through direct
transfers and is primarily used towards the GIRoA recurrent budget.
Trust funds, specifically the ARTF, constitute the majority of Afghan government
managed aid. But, it is important to note that GIRoA managed aid does not mean the
Afghan government has free‐range use of the funds. Non‐discretionary budget support,
as its name suggests, gives funding for specific activities and projects that the Afghan
government has no control over. The major trust funds are following the National
Implementation Modality (NIM), whereby the GIRoA does control the finances and
allocation of resources for development project.
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A major issue surrounding Afghanistan’s government controlled aid is the
dichotomy of aid allocation; the Afghan government is not truly controlling aid if it does
not have the power to direct where the aid goes. While a trend has finally emerged to
increase funding through the Afghan government, further measures need to be
implemented to involve the Afghan government and include the GIRoA in development
and investment activities. Development of Afghanistan should be a joint consultation
between the Afghan government and its people; in order to spur development in a
foreign land with foreign values and norms, the Afghan people are the most important
resource in deciding where best to invest at both the local and national level. In order
for capacity building to take place in the Afghan government, increased funding need be
channeled through the Afghan government so it can develop and establish itself as an
independent body capable of providing for the Afghan people.

Trust Funds
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund is the largest contributor to the
GIRoA budget for both operating and development costs. 139 The trust fund was created
in May 2002 by the World Bank to support the recurrent budget of the Afghan
government. The recurrent budget is the overall operating budget of the government,
which includes payment of government salaries, ministries, and basic government
operations. However, with more countries and donors providing funding through the

139 “Quarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,” World Bank, July 2010, p. 16.
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ARTF, the ARTF increased its range of operation to additionally invest in national
programs and development projects. 140
Since 2001, the ARTF has allocated $3.7 billion, of which $3.2 billion has been
disbursed, yielding a very strong 91.4% use of available funds. 141 Currently, the ARTF
operates with two financial windows—two specific areas in which funding can be
allocated—providing funding to the Recurrent Cost Window and the Investment
Window. The disbursed funding provided $1.95 billion to the Recurrent Cost Window
and $1.2 billion to the Investment Window, over the same time period. 142 Thirty‐two
international donors have provided funding for the ARTF, reflecting strong
international support for an Afghan‐run and Afghan‐operated development program.
The operation of the ARTF is administered by its founder, the World Bank, but is
overseen by a joint committee including the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),
and the UNDP. The Afghan Ministry of Finance also serves an administrative role in the
trust fund as an observer to the committee. 143
The primary support of the ARTF goes to the recurrent budget costs for
Afghanistan, the operational costs for running the Afghan government and funding its
continual growth. Increasing the capacity of Ministries and government workers
requires funding for the salaries for government employees, teachers, health workers,
140 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “Donor Financial Review” (2009), p. 17.
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and civilian staff throughout the country. The Recurrent Cost Window is fairly
straightforward, in terms of investment, as there is a clear understanding of where
funding is allocated and why. However, the Investment Window is more complex, with
multiple alleys, sectors, and programs through which to invest. In 2009, the financial
breakdown for Investment Window operations was $150.78 million for the National
Solidarity Program (NSP), $70.42 million for Microfinance programs, $67.45 million for
Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP), and a combined $91.35 million for
energy development projects. 144
The NSP is the largest and most prestigious of these national development
programs. The NSP was created in 2003 by the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development to work with Community Development Councils (CDCs) to strengthen
local governance through funding projects at the village level. 145 The NSP has received
over $600 million since 2001, which it has utilized to finance over 50,788 projects in
over 22,000 villages in 34 provinces. 146 The core mission of the NSP is to give the
Afghans a say in their development by funding projects and activities chosen by the
Afghan people through local CDCs. These projects range in size and quantity from a dam
project in Behsood in the Nangarhar Province to a large‐scale irrigation and crop
development project in Shinwar in the Nangarhar Province that received $46,000 from
the NSP and raised $5,000 from local villagers. 147 A local citizen in the Nangarhar
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province spoke to the support and success of the NSP through the ARTF, noting, “when
there are problems in our communities, with assistance from the National Solidarity
Program projects we (the local citizens) can identify the challenges. The NSP is proof
that we’ve learned in this village—when we come across problems we can find a way to
solve them.” 148
EQUIP is a highly successful Afghan‐run program that proves to the international
community that the Afghan people do want to increase education opportunities for
their people. Communities across Afghanistan are working at the local and national
level to secure funding for educational projects, building schools and hiring teachers
among other initiatives that has helped 6.3 million children return to school, 2.2 million
of which are women. 149
Microfinance loans have been an increasingly effective means to help bring
stimulate the Afghan economy and bring citizens out of poverty and into prosperity.
Since 2001, these microfinance loans provided through the ARTF have been given to
over 1.4 million Afghans, 60% of whom have been women. 150 Energy sector projects
include the Kabul‐Aybak/Mazar‐e‐Sharif Power Project, the Rehabilitation of Naghlu
Hydropower Plant, and the Afghanistan Power System Development Project. 151 These
projects have directly increased Afghan access to electricity, and coupled with a
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previous project to import Uzbek electricity, an additional 100,000 urban household
now have electricity in 2009 alone. 152
Nonspecific ARTF Investment Window projects have helped to plant 1,130
hectares of new horticultural orchards (grapes, apricots, almonds, and pomegranates)
in 11 provinces, construct over 11,000 kilometers of rural access roads that connects
over 27,000 villages across the country. 153 Not only do ARTF projects provide tangible
results, but also the associated work in these projects has employed local Afghans,
stimulating new industry and the Afghan economy.
The ARTF has received positive marks both from within Afghanistan as well as
outside donors. Marshall Elliot, Country Head of DFID in Afghanistan, remarked, “the
ARTF is by far, on the view of the United Kingdom, the most successful program that
we’ve had.” 154 US politicians shared similar views, as William Frej, Mission Director of
USAID Afghanistan, stated “we [the United States] have the highest level of confidence
that this [ARTF] is a financially sound and capably managed and accountable financial
window for our donor resources.” 155 With such high marks from the two largest donors
to the ARTF, the international community began to take note of ARTF success as
recently as the London Conference in 2010, pledging to increase funding through the
ARTF. From 2010‐2013 $2.6 billion will be made available for use by the ARTF, a 32%
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increase in ARTF funding from the end of fiscal year 2009. 156 These positive marks from
the international community are representative of the three overarching successes of
the ARTF: efficient integration and capacity building of the Afghan MoF, successful
community‐based development projects, and primarily because this Afghan
government‐run program has been increasingly accountable in disseminating program
information. 157 The latter is the fundamental key to argue for increased aid through the
Afghan government. The ARTF proves the GIRoA can allocate and funds and invest in
successful community‐based development projects, while providing detailed reports on
financial investments and project execution to the donor community. This act of
government accountability is paramount, as the ARTF’s successes have correlated with
an extension of the program beyond its original end date of June 2006, to June 2020. 158
Accountability is key—through successful dissemination of ARTF reports, Afghan
government can make the claim to increase Afghan‐managed aid.
Increasing funding through an Afghan‐managed development program
represents a fundamental change in international donor policy, as international donors
previously have made promises since the Berlin Donor Conference in 2004 to increase
funding through the Afghan government, but have failed to do so in a substantial
manner. Announcing this shift moving forward reveals a few major changes in
international policy: the international community has accepted that the GIRoA can
manage its own development projects; the GIRoA can be held financially accountable
156 “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Report to Congress in accordance
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for international aid; and the international community can begin a process of increasing
GIRoA responsibility over the development of its state and allow the international
community to slowly decrease their presence in Afghanistan.

Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)
The UN Development Program established the Law and Order Trust Fund for
Afghanistan (LOTFA) in 2002. The trust fund was created in order to generate funding
to support the ANP through the Afghan government. In this capacity the LOTFA has two
primary foci: financing the ANP recurrent budget and financing ANP infrastructure
projects. 159 Through these broad program goals the LOTFA was able to receive $980
million in donor funding, or which $868 million was disbursed from 2002‐2010. 160
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the UNDP, the United Kingdom,
Australia, the United States, Latvia, Iceland, Italy and the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) provided funding for the LOTFA. 161
The LOTFA was created in five phases dated as follows: Phase I (November 2003
– March 2004), Phase II (April 2004 – March 2005), Phase III (April 2005 – March
2006), Phase IV (April 2006 – August 2008) and most recently Phase V (September
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2008 – August 2010). 162 Upon the completion of Phase V, the LOTFA was ended, having
completed its goals and functions. Through its program and mission it has made
significant accomplishments over the past eight years.
Through financing the payment of ANP salaries, the LOTFA funneled all
resources through the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MoF), in accordance with the
National Implementation Modality—meaning the GIRoA nationally manages the
finances and operations of the LOTFA. 163 In this capacity, the LOTFA was able to
successfully pay the salaries of over 96,000 police and increase the operational capacity
of the Afghan MoF. Of these police the LOTFA was paying, the program placed a large
emphasis on increasing efforts to recruit women. While the numbers are not staggering,
the LOTFA was able in 2009 to recruit 714 females to join the ANP, of whom 130
became officers, 359 became sergeants and 225 became patrolwomen. 164
To increase financial oversight and the accountability of the MoF and MoI, the
LOTFA created an electronic payroll system (EPS) and electronic fund transfer (EFT)
system in Afghanistan. The EPS allows electronic salary payment, in this case for the
ANP, which allows for simple tracking of finances and salary monitoring. With
increased financial accountability, 99.5% of all police officers have their salary paid
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through the EPS through one of the 115 EPS stations the LOTFA built. 165 To ease
financial transfers, the EFT system was established by the LOTFA to increase the
capacity and ease of using the electronic payroll system. EFT systems are active in 31 of
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, providing financial transfer assistance to over 77% of the
ANP. 166 Both of these mechanisms allow for greater accountability from the GIRoA, and
with periodic follow‐up from the international community the Afghan government will
increase its capacity to monitor financial statement through reporting and regulating
provincial EPS reports. 167
Infrastructure was another area in which LOTFA invested and provided
financing. In this area, the LOTFA was successful in establish both the EPS and EFT
systems and the respective stations for each. But, LOTFA funding was also used on ten
primary construction projects, building a 200‐bed hospital in Kabul, a fire brigade in
Kabul, numerous highway check posts for the ABP, and many more. 168
Even with these accomplishments, the long‐term stability and function of the
MoI and MoF remain in question. The LOTFA faces challenges moving forward,
primarily regarding the ability of the MoI and MoF to run and oversee budget
operations of the ANP without assistance or direct oversight through the LOTFA. The
LOTFA was ended on August 31, 2010 and over eight years provided the framework
and institutions to allow for the MoI and MoF to function in an effective manner. With
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programs like the EPS and EFT, the LOTFA has accomplished its goals and is at a point
where the GIRoA can and must assume all responsibilities to carry on with ministerial
duties. This is an essential step that ensures the Afghan government and ministries can
eventually function independently of international aid in the future.
The LOTFA poured financial and developmental resources into training and
recruiting a strong ANP. Through intensive training programs, creation of the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs, and nation‐wide recruiting efforts, it is now the responsibility of the
Afghan government to ensure trained police officers are retained, and an effort to
recruit women to the ANP continues. 169
On the macro‐level, criticisms are prevalent that the LOTFA represents yet
another program delivering increased financial services to the security sector of
Afghanistan.
Despite the need for an effective, well‐equipped and trained police force,
currently the national police personnel operate under severe constraints
due in part to limited human and material resources, but also because of
the non‐traditional roles that it has increasingly been required to assume.
The ANP has continued to expand, but the quality of the police has
remained questionable. 170
This is a valid criticism of the ANP and is an issue that runs through all aspects of the
ANSF. However, the broader goal of the LOTFA directly increases central government
capacity. At the macro level, a successful, accountable, and proactive MoI will ensure the
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success of the LOTFA and ANP. By following the National Implementation Modality, the
GIRoA—specifically the Ministry of Interior—has remained in sole control over the
LOTFA and focused efforts on increasing accountability and function of central
government ministries. If the MoI proves to be a powerful and functioning body, it will
oversee ANP operations, ensuring women are recruited to the police force and highly
trained personnel are retained. In the event problems arise, through the capacity‐
building activities of the LOTFA, the MoI has the training and insight to make necessary
changes to address the problems it faces.

Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF)
The Counter Narcotics Trust Fund was created and administered in 2005 by the
United Nations Development Program to assist the GIRoA in its implementation of the
National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). The trust fund was closed in December 2008,
but was extended one additional year through 2009 to assist in a timely transition of
responsibilities to the Afghan government. 171 As of July 2009, $99 million had been
allocated to the CNTF, of which $62 million was disbursed. 172 It is important to note
that all financing provided to the Afghan government was funded through the National
Implementation Modality (NIM), meaning the GIRoA had full responsibility for the
finances. 173 In this context, CNTF finances were used for four key purposes: providing
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resources for GIRoA counter narcotics programs, increasing transparency of counter
narcotics funding and project allocations, increasing the GIRoA’s capacity to run
successful counter narcotics programs, and increasing cooperation across counter
narcotics activities. 174
With these overarching principles for CNTF finances, specific funding initiative
fell in line with NDCS guidelines, with finances being spent on supporting: alternative
livelihoods, building institutions (regional counternarcotics centers), public awareness,
law enforcement, criminal justice, eradication, drug demand reduction and treatment of
drug addicts, international and regional co‐operation. 175 With these funding guidelines,
the CNTF did have many clear achievements. During the four years of CNTF activity, 31
projects were approved for CNTF funding across 17 provinces. Of those 31 projects, 21
were in alternative livelihoods, 4 in drug demand reduction, 1 in public awareness
raising, 1 in law enforcement and 1 in institution building. 176
Even with 31 projects completed over a 4‐year span, the CNTF received very
small amounts of funding, relatively unsubstantial when compared to international aid
as whole. As a result the CNTF has and still continues to face challenges. Most notable is
the lack of program funding for the CNTF. Over the years of operation, the CNTF
produced a target budget of 900 million over three years, of which 99 million was
committed. 177 That represents roughly 11% of what the UNDP deemed necessary to
operate a successful Counter Narcotics Trust Fund, and for such a serious issue of
counternarcotics, that is simply not effective in sustaining long‐term development.
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Reasons are vague as to why there was such a gross discrepancy between requested
finances and what was ultimately provided. One problem noted with the CNTF was that
there were not enough CNTF‐run donor meetings to generate international support and
raise money. 178 However, the CNTF was a UNDP program and that alone should have
sufficed to generate international support and finance. What I believe is more pertinent
to lack of financial support is that the major supplier of international aid to Afghanistan,
the United States, was already leading independent military and counternarcotics
operations under Operation Enduring Freedom and saw no use investing significant
money in the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, when it was already doing what it deemed
productive work.
Regardless of funding shortfall, the CNTF did target drug related activity in a
productive manner. Barnett Rubin notes that there should not be a short‐term focus on
eliminating narcotics—Afghan economic growth will stall as individuals fall further into
poverty—eliminating narcotics will take well over a decade, and crop eradication is a
counterproductive way to start such a program. 179 The CNTF understood this issue,
focusing primary counternarcotics efforts on promoting and teaching alternative
livelihoods to achieve long‐term drug eradication.
Another large challenge that plagued the CNTF has been the low capacity of the
GIRoA. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics was stalled with massive delays in completing
projects and delivery of counter narcotic needs. 180 Drug production and trade is a major
issue within Afghanistan and with only growing power both governmentally and
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military, the current GIRoA and ANSF are not an equal match to the diverse drug
producing community. The recent appointment of Zarar Ahmad Moqbel to Counter
Narcotics Minister reflects these concerns. Mr. Moqbel, the former Interior Minister
accused of widespread corruption, brings a history of reported auctioning of high‐
ranking police positions to the highest bidder to the MoCN. 181 The British openly
objected President Karzai’s appointment of Moqbel, and fears of future corruption in a
key area such a counternarcotics are rampant.
This issue represents the further need to focus development efforts on
increasing the capacity of the Afghan government, particularly at the ministerial level. If
accountability is obtained at the Ministerial level, the trickle‐down effect can take place,
where the Afghan government can operate and coordinate sustainable development
and achieve a status quo where efforts and funding are properly managed.
Development programs and efforts will fail if the Afghan government branches cannot
be held accountable due to lack to capacity building and training. Minister Moqbel
represents the fundamental key in ministerial growth, and the future success of the
CNTF faces this harsh reality, reaffirming the necessity to shift development and aid
focus away from security and towards capacity building of the previously non‐existent
Afghan government.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The concluding section is focused to address the overall evaluation of the
international development programs in Afghanistan, both from macro and micro
levels—addressing actions at the international level as well at the local level in
Afghanistan. The international level will highlight international support for government
building activities coupled with the problems the international community faces in
Afghanistan development efforts. At the state level, problems with specific development
programs will be presented, followed with overall recommendations for increasing the
efficiency and effectiveness of aid in Afghanistan.

InternationalLevel
International Support for Developing the Afghan Government
After 20 years of continuous war until the US‐led invasion of Afghanistan in
2001, Afghanistan was one of the most comprehensively destroyed countries since
WWII. Ahmed Rashid vividly describes this dire situation in Afghanistan:
Tragically, the Afghans had done more damage to their own country than
had the Soviets. Whereas the Soviets had fought much of their war in the
rural Pashtun belt, the Afghanistan civil war in the 1990s had destroyed
the cities and infrastructure as warring factions bombarded Kabul and
destroyed or looted the infrastructure—right down to selling off
telegraph wire and road fences in Pakistan. Roads, power and telephone
lines, water and sewer pipes, houses, shops, schools, and hospitals—
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everything looked like burned‐out shells or upturned carcasses. When the
Taliban arrived they had no interest in rebuilding the country or the
money to do so. 182
Under Taliban rule, international aid was sparse and only the UN, Red Cross and a few
NGOs remained committed to providing food, running hospitals and providing
accommodations for the over 1 million internally displaced persons in Afghanistan. The
Taliban made delivery of western aid increasingly difficult, as “Osama bin Laden
persuaded the Taliban to expel all Western aid agencies and impose such restrictive
laws on Western aid workers… imposing restrictions on providing health care,
education and food to women and then tried to force the UN to discriminate against
women.” 183 Eventually the Taliban outlawed western aid, causing the UN to end all flow
of aid right before al‐Qaeda’s September 11th attacks. This combination of a war‐torn
state, people suffering from the lack of basic services (food, healthcare and education),
non‐existent infrastructure, all coupled with a period of relatively little international aid
made Afghanistan a state in desperate need of international aid after the ouster of the
Taliban.
When Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001, there were international
pleas for nation‐building activities the likes of Germany and Japan. James Dobbins,
former US Ambassador to the European Union and lead negotiator of the Bonn
Agreement, called for the creation of an Afghan‐Marshall Plan, a comprehensive nation
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and economic rebuilding program. 184 While many in the policy arena advocated for
nation‐building activities, President George W. Bush and his conservative staff, led
primarily by Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, saw
no interest in nation building.
President Bush emphasized his position to end nation‐building activities by not
extending President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 56 in 2001, an order that
“created a cohesive program for educating and training personnel for peacekeeping
missions.” 185 In addition, Secretary Rumsfeld shut down the US Army Peacekeeping
Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the War College that educated and graduated former
President Dwight Eisenhower and General George Patton. 186 President Bush also cut
the staff and budget of USAID, decreasing the staff from 13,000 employees to 2,300 by
2001. In this move, Bush also reassigned USAID as a subsidiary organization under the
US Department of State, removing its independence as a non‐partisan agency solely
dedicated to international development efforts. This issue provoked Robert Finn,
former US Ambassador to Afghanistan and Central Asia expert, to comment on these
appalling changes to USAID, as he noted “USAID is doing nothing itself now, it has
become a contracting agency with layers of bureaucracy that did not exist in the past
and too much of the money comes back to the US through consultancies.” 187
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With eight years of neglect towards nation building and development efforts—
both from the governmental level and lack of capacity of USAID—President Obama
inherited a war dominated by counterinsurgency operations. The Afghan central
government was neglected from the local to federal levels, left to fend for itself in an
environment historically ruled by corruption and consolidation of power. However, the
US was aware of these issues, as concerns about properly rebuilding Afghanistan were
raised from the first days of the US‐led invasion. Barnett Rubin and Ashraf Ghani,
Afghanistan experts who in the early stages of the war were advising the UN and Hamid
Karzai, suggested a simple joint development plan (UN‐Afghan) to create one central
trust fund for holding international donations, which the Afghan government could pool
from in development efforts.
This simple plan would allow the donor community to oversee Afghan
government development efforts, but would streamline efforts in developing the
capacity of the GIRoA. Rubin and Ghani argued that a central trust fund would remove
the need for individual donors to set up their own projects and programs, which as seen
in practice often duplicate efforts and ignore the big‐picture infrastructure
necessities. 188 However, through ten years in Afghanistan donors have overlooked this
issue and independently invested in and created individual development projects. In
doing so, donors undermined their own efforts through not consulting with the Afghan
government, and through emphasizing these direct investment projects, rendered the
Afghan government ineffective. Francis Fukuyama, Director of the International
Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at
188 Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos: the United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan,
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Johns Hopkins University, highlighted this problem in what he dubbed the “Parallel
Donor Bureaucracy,” where early donor programs directly benefitted the Afghan
people, through short‐term tangible projects and humanitarian relief, but at the same
time undermined the accountability and growth of the Afghan government ministries.
Donor projects need to increase the capacity of governance while providing a service of
need, but the latter almost always wins because of the incentives facing the donor
nations—providing a quick and concrete development success it can pitch to its
people. 189
With these prior conditions impacting international aid and development
practices, it is imperative for the international community—mainly President Obama
and the United States, as the overwhelming provider of aid—to make immediate
adjustments to how it is approaching the development of Afghanistan. In the path to
creating a new Afghan state—including building a complete governing system from
scratch—the United States and the broader international community have taken
measures to build‐up the Afghan state. As stated earlier, to ensure aid and development
are used properly, Afghan state capacity must reach a level where it can formally tax its
people and generate state revenue, as to alleviate the need for aid. Secondly, donors
must work closely with and integrate the Afghan government in aid disbursal, as to
supplement and grow government capacity, not replacing its function and rendering it
ineffective. With those guiding principles in mind, it is essential to examine the impact
of what the United States and the international donor community have done to develop
the capacity of the Afghan government through aid programs.
189 Francis Fukuyama, State Building, Governance and World Order in the Twentyfirst Century, London:
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The primary development programs that have targeted the capacity building of
the GIRoA have been the Community Development Councils (CDC), District Delivery
Programs (DDP), the UNDP National Area‐Based Development Program (NABDP), and
the three trust funds (ARTF, LOTFA, CNTF). CDCs, an initiative of the National Solidarity
Program—funded by the ARTF, are village‐level elected individuals who serve as local
governing officials and organize aid and development projects for their respective
villages. As of August 8, 2009, over 22,000 CDCs had been elected, of which 20,000 had
received funding for local development projects. These CDCs are active in over 6,000
villages and have facilitated the development of 31,000 completed projects with an
additional 19,000 projects currently being developed. 190 CDCs function in the short‐
term as a means to organize local communities and plan development projects, but in
the long‐term can develop into the local governing bodies and structure for
Afghanistan. The ARTF was overwhelmingly supported, both politically and financially,
by the United States and United Kingdom, which invested $721 million and $844
million, respectively. 191 In this capacity the US and UK have supported a structure to
provide means at the village level, and develop the capacity of village‐level governance.
District Development Programs (DDP) are an initiative of the Afghanistan Social
Outreach Program, created by the IDLG. This Afghan‐run program is monitored by the
Ministry of Finance and creates district‐level councils, one level higher than CDCs, to
deliver goods and services from the federal government to the local district. There are
currently 90 reported DDPs, with 11 in the Zabul Province, 3 in the Logar Province, and
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15 in the Kunar Province. 192 DDPs are scheduled to expand to 100 districts in 2011 and
seem to be on pace to achieve that target. These district‐level councils supplement the
village‐level CDCs and create the infrastructure to transition these programs from aid
and development services into local and regional governing bodies.
The NABDP is another venture of the UNDP, which has created programs to
monitor and train the Afghan government in capacity building activities. District
Development Assemblies (DAA), a project of the NABDP that helps facilitate capacity
building of the local Afghan development efforts. Working at the district level, DAAs
have been dispatched to 374 districts to mobilize local communities to work
collectively to create development projects for the community at the district level. 193
DAAs are not a precedent for local governance, but supplement the work of CDCs and
DDPs to rally community support and legitimize the bodies. However, the NABDP is
involved in other capacity‐building measures, including government‐training programs.
It has funded disaster‐management training in 30 districts and capacity‐building
training in 48 districts, to further aid in the development of a functioning Afghan
government. 194
With CDCs, DDPs and NABDP‐affiliated programs all addressing government
capacity at the local level, the ARTF, CNTF and LOTFA have served to address capacity
building at the federal level. All three trust funds follow the National Implementation
Modality, meaning that all funding goes through the Afghan Ministry of Finance and is
192 “National Area‐Based Development Program Phase III,” United Nations Development Program
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directly disbursed to the projects and programs the Afghan government selects.
Together all of these projects are working independently to increase the capacity of the
Afghan government from the federal to local levels. As the ARTF funds money through
the MoF, the CDCs are rallying local support for development projects. These programs
are directly related, as CDC activities at the village level are funded by the ARTF, which
is controlled by the MoF. These connections help to bridge federal government activity
to the local population.
While developing the capacity of the Afghan government at each level is
important, attention also is being paid to ensure these levels for government—federal,
provincial, district, and village—coordinate efforts and work collectively. While these
initiatives and projects are a step in the right direction, as previously mentioned, trust
funds suffered greatly from a lack of international financing and support over the first 8
years in Afghanistan. States have been reluctant to invest aid through the Afghan
government because of high levels of corruption and decreasing support for Hamid
Karzai. The combination of corruption and lack of support has fostered an environment
where states do not want to invest in a government with which it has a fractious
relationship.
Concerns over Afghan corruption have focused on the Afghan companies that are
receiving aid and development contracts. Ahmed Wali Karzai, brother of Hamid Karzai,
and Hamed Wardak, son of the Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak, both have
substantial financial investments in private military companies, and have received a
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disproportionate amount of security contracts from the Afghan government. 195 The
United States, with growing fears about corruption at the highest levels of the Afghan
government, launched an anti‐corruption investigation of Hamid Karzai and his inner
circle. 196 Investigations have revealed potential corruption in ministerial appointments
in the aftermath of Karzai’s successful reelection bid in 2009. The United Kingdom
expressed their corruption concerns after Karzai’s appointment of Zarar Ahmad Moqbel
to Minister of Counter Narcotics in January 2010. 197 Moqbel was the former Minister of
Interior until 2008 when he was forced to resign amid international contentions over
widespread corruption. Gordon Brown, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, spoke to
the concerns over corruption in the Afghan government, noting, “the United Kingdom
would not fund any ministries that were failing to tackle graft.” 198
Even after the most recent parliamentary elections in August 2009, the Afghan
parliament rejected 17 of 24 ministerial appointments made by President Karzai that
following January. 199 Karzai made appointments to the Departments of Higher
Education, Commerce, Transportation, and Public Works, all of which were rejected by
Parliament. These appointments were blocked because appointed individuals were
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grossly inexperienced and had ties to warlords and powerbrokers—which were seen as
payoffs for supporting Karzai in his reelection bid. 200
While international concerns over corruption correlated with deteriorating
relations with Afghanistan, the United States maintained poor relations with Karzai
through constant turnover with diplomats and oft‐changing policies. This created great
tension between the nations, increasing international skepticism of President Karzai.
Hamid Karzai was a perfect choice for interim President of Afghanistan, as he came
from a politically active and prominent Pashtun family and had strong disdain for the
Taliban and has most of his life—not to mention growing hatred after the Taliban
reportedly assassinated his father in 1999. 201 From the early days of the US‐led
invasion of Afghanistan, Karzai, once appointed the interim President of Afghan had a
strong relationship with President Bush. Karzai made the infamous statement in 2002,
“Afghanistan is a good partner. It will stay a good partner. And I'm sure that the future
of the two countries will be good and a wonderful relationship should be expected to
come in the future.” 202
However that positive relationship has since fractured. Once the Taliban was
removed from power and fled, the US shifted its focus to Iraq and left Afghanistan alone
for two years, allowing the Taliban to regroup and launch its resurgence in 2003.
Coupled with this lack of attention, poor relations with US diplomats and the oft‐
changing roles and responsibilities of US diplomats made a working relationship
difficult. During the first two years, Robert Finn, Bush’s first ambassador to Afghanistan,
200 Ibid.
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was ineffective as he was not able to allocate any resources to Afghanistan, as the US
was preoccupied with Iraq. Karzai had great relations with Bush’s next ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad. Khalilzad was an Afghan‐American, and spoke the same language—
both in dialect and rhetoric. Khalilzad was able to jump start financing development
projects in Afghanistan following 2003 and specifically criticized Pakistan’s role in
supporting the Taliban. 203
However, Bush reassigned Khalilzad in 2005 to run the embassy in Baghdad,
removing the one person who understood the situation in Afghanistan and had strong
relations with Karzai. In his absence, the US began sending a large number of
congressional delegates who all shared differing policy advice and annoyed President
Karzai. 204 William Wood, the third Bush appointed ambassador, was coming fresh off a
successful stint in Colombia where he excelled in combating drug production. Wood
brought this approach to Afghanistan, greatly conflicting with Karzai’s priorities. Wood
suggested Karzai launch air raids to spray chemicals over poppy fields to diminish drug
trade and a main financing mechanism of the Taliban, but Karzai feared a revolt of
farmers. By the end of 2008, presidential turnover was taking place, bringing in yet
again a new group of diplomats Karzai did not know. Karzai and Holbrooke had
lukewarm relations at best. Karzai felt Holbrooke was trying to remove him from office
by supporting presidential candidates Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani in 2009,
when Holbrooke was actually lobbying congress and President Obama to devote more
resources to the development of Afghanistan. Relations with Karl Eikenberry have been
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poor ever since Eikenberry’s comments that Afghanistan “is not an adequate strategic
partner” and “continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden.” 205 Stanley
McChrystal had an incredibly strong relationship with Karzai as he often deferred to
President Karzai in decision‐making matters. 206 Karzai himself begged the United States
not to fire McChrystal amid the controversial “Rolling Stone” article. 207 All of Obama’s
top aids, former National Security Advisor James Jones, current ISAF Commander David
Petraeus, and Vice President Joe Biden all have suffered poor working relations with
Hamid Karzai. James Jones made statements that Karzai was not doing enough to
effectively run his country, Obama and Biden have often sent mixed policy messages to
Karzai not to mention Obama shunning a visit to Karzai when he was in Bagram in
December of 2010. Petraeus may have the worst rapport of any US official, as his
aggressive approach of making hard blows to weaken the Taliban runs counter to
Karzai’s policy of working with Iran and Pakistan to mediate reconciliation with the
Taliban. 208
While these tumultuous relationships with US officials seems to remove any
blame for President Karzai, that is not the case. Constant turnover of US diplomats and
officials, coupled with constantly changing policy objectives have further supported
fractious relations with Afghanistan, which are built on Afghan corruption. These issues
together have fueled international distrust for President Karzai and the Afghan state,
the main reasons why states refuse to invest more money in the Afghan government.
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Amid these concerns, a greater emphasis needs to be placed on building up the
Afghan government in terms of power and legitimacy from the federal to local levels,
ensuring sustainable and durable development can continue in the future. A simple way
of increasing government capacity and coordination is through increasing the amount
of funding through the ARTF. This is the last remaining and active trust fund, which
through investing allows the international donor community to increase its role in
overseeing the capacity building of the Afghan government, while giving the Afghan
government increased resources to expand operations. States need to overlook fears of
corruption and dislike for Karzai in hopes that redirected aid will yield a more
accountable President and government.

InternationalLevel Problems in Afghan Development
As development and Afghanistan experts pushed the need to invest through the
Afghan government in a top‐down approach, the alternative occurred, as donors
invested in individual projects. These uncoordinated, individual efforts established
many hurdles over eight years, limiting the overall effectiveness of delivering aid and
developing the Afghan government.
Problems arose from the beginning at the Tokyo Donor Conference in 2001. This
first international donor conference raised money for the development of Afghanistan,
but failed to properly assess the total amount of aid Afghanistan needed. A joint report
filed by the UNDP, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank “guesstimated”
Afghanistan needed $1.7 billion over the first thirty months plus an additional $10
billion over the first five years. A report generated by the European Union suggested
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totals of $9‐12 billion over the first five years and $22 billion over the first decade. 209
With such differing figures, it is clear that the total costs required to rebuild and
develop Afghanistan were unknown.
This is an issue a nation, IFI, or NGO cannot be held accountable for. Afghanistan
was a comprehensive mess; no entity could have accurately assessed the budget for
developing government at the federal and local levels, rebuilding all forms of
infrastructure, plus humanitarian aid. However, the international community can be
held accountable for other failures at the Tokyo Donor Conference. Donors failed to
differentiate between aid designated for humanitarian purposes and infrastructure; all
aid was lumped together in one universal fund. As a result, most aid pledged at Tokyo
was designated for humanitarian relief, and no true reconstruction projects were
developed. While Afghans insisted no development was occurring in the country, the
donor community countered, pointing to the large amounts of money spent in the
country. Money was being spent, but in the two years after the Tokyo Donor
Conference, no roads were built, no new electricity or water was provided for
Afghans. 210
The international community not only underestimated the amount of aid
necessary to fuel Afghanistan’s reconstruction, but also mismanaged how and where to
invest aid. As a result, two major issues occurred and need immediate attention at the
international level: examining why little aid is being invested through the recipient
government and overcoming the shortfall of pledged aid versus allocated aid.
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Since the Berlin Donor Conference in 2004, donor nations have pledged to
increase funding through the GIRoA, specifically with multiyear investments that would
allow the Afghan government to develop and increase its capacity. However, while
nations have promised reforms and changes to international aid patterns, little has
changed. At the Berlin Donor Conference in 2004, London Donor Conference in 2006
and the Paris Donor Conference in 2008, all donor nations agreed to and signed
conference resolutions calling for increases in multiyear donations specifically through
the Afghan government. That promise has not occurred, as since 2001 nearly 80% of all
aid is still donor managed.
Afghan Aid by Modality, 20012009 211
Modality
Donor Managed Aid

Disbursement (USD, billion)
$29.190

Percentage
77%

Afghan Government Managed Aid

$8.691

23%

Total

$37.881

100%

Richard Holbrooke, former US Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
emphasized the need to change US policy by increasing the amount of aid the United
States gave through the Afghan government:
When we took office, less than 9 percent of all American assistance went
through the government. So we were undermining the government we
were trying to strengthen. That was not right. We set a goal of 50
percent of the aid. We’re up to about 14 percent now. It’s a very tough
thing because we—because of government congressional requirements

211 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “Donor Financial Review” (2009), p. 42.
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for accountability, we have to be sure that we certify ministries to receive
the aid directly. And that’s going at pace… which is to strengthen the
government by funneling as much assistance as we can through the
government and encouraging them to improve their governance. …
We’re trying to… use our aid to strengthen the government so the
government… has greater governance capacity and… is less dependent on
us. 212
Holbrooke made this statement less than one year ago, and while it shows senior
government officials are supportive of increasing aid through the Afghan government,
the necessary change is not occurring. Aid through the GIRoA increased by a total of 5%
over the first 8 years from 2001‐2008, making the optimistic goals of 50% seem
incredibly unlikely. However, the US has not been the only nation to neglect investing
aid through the GIRoA, and as a result of poor allocation through the GIRoA, Afghan‐led
development initiatives have greatly suffered.
Two major acts of legislation were created at the London Donor Conference, the
ANDS and the JCMB (Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board). The ANDS, the Afghan‐
created national development framework, was created upon the request of the
international community. The ANDS was revealed two years later at the Paris Donor
Conference, revealing the framework through which donors would invest and help spur
the development of the Afghan government. The ANDS requested $50.1 billion to
effectively provide the necessary aid and development Afghanistan needed. However,
the ANDS has since only received $10.2 billion, a fraction of what the Afghan
212 Richard Holbrooke, US Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, “Preview of the Washington Visit
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government deemed necessary to develop its country. 213 Even with the program being
revealed at its international donor conference, the ANDS was only able to raise 20% of
its targeted and anticipated budget.
The JCMB is a body that was created to increase donor‐to‐government
coordination, an increasingly important role once the ANDS was created. Theoretically,
the JCMB would coordinate priorities between the Afghan government and individual
donors, but it has failed to become a relevant institution. These Afghan‐run initiatives
needed international support, but as they never received the integrity and financing
they needed to survive, the JCMB provided a service that was not in need.
A similar fate met the CNTF, a trust fund that followed the NIM guidelines and
directly supported the capacity building of the MoCN and MoF. Upon its creation, the
CNTF requested donations to cover an operating budget of $900 million over five years,
but only received $99 million by the time it ended in 2009. 214 The CNTF received
slightly more than 10% of its requested budget, money that would have been controlled
by the GIRoA, and utilized to strengthen key government ministries.
Over the past ten years, Afghanistan’s government and development programs
have suffered due to lack of funding. Development programs and initiatives are created
based on pledged donations, however when pledges are not honored—either with
respect to time for delivery or financial obligation, programs cannot function as
planned.
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Percentage of Disbursed versus Pledged Aid (20022009) 215
Pledged

Disbursed

(20022009)

(20022009)

US

38,000

23,417

61.6%

2

UK

2,897

1,546

53.4%

3

WB

2,800

1,364

48.7%

4

ABD

2,200

618

28.1%

5

EU

2,037

1,576

77.4%

6

Japan

1,900

990

52.1%

7

Canada

1,679

898

53.5%

8

India

1,200

662

55.2%

9

Germany

1,188

584

49.2%

10

Norway

938

324

63.8%

Overall Total

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

62,035

46,099

54.3%

Rank

Donor

1

Percentage

Based on the individual donations of foreign nations, IGOs and IFIs, roughly 1/2 of
pledged aid was actually disbursed in Afghanistan. Programs cannot function effectively
if they never receive 50% of the anticipated funding. Disbursement shortfalls exist
beyond donor nations, to donor conferences and individual development programs as
well.
Afghanistan is dependent on foreign aid, and when it schedules and plans
reconstruction and development efforts around the influx of foreign aid, donors need to
be held accountable for the amount of, and timetable for, fund delivery, barring
unforeseen circumstances. However, in reality states provide financial support on a
215 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “Donor Financial Review” (2009), p. 38.
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donation basis and cannot be held accountable for pledged donations. At the end of the
day, a donation for less than what was originally pledged is still a donation. Holding
states accountable for pledged donations will further divide the donor community and
potentially alienate a major source of funding.
This major issue of continuing shortfalls between donors’ pledged funding and
disbursed funding will always exist. Instead of tormenting states and risking losing
potential donors, a solution needs to be created in the face of these problems. Creating a
simple back‐up fund at the international level is a quick and easy means to provide
funding to a state in the event of delayed payment or aid shortfall. Only a few
organizations have the organizational capacity and budget to operate a fund of this sort:
the UNDP, World Bank or IMF. Each organization can independently fundraise, or in
terms of the UN allocate a specific amount of member nation fees to this universal trust
fund. States receiving development and aid assistance cannot make the argument that
development plans are failing due to delays in aid or shortfalls in pledged amounts.
Individual states and organizations are investing too much money and too many
resources to see efforts stall due to financial constraints. The creation of this fund
would, in the event of aid shortfall or delay, provide the necessary funding for a given
project to continue without hiccups. While a simple project, this fund would facilitate
the smooth continuation of development projects, and ensure successful development
and aid projects.
With these overarching issues of macro‐level development, there is a major
piece missing from the international level that could have identified these issues and
shared information with the at‐large donor community, a High Representative. This
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position was originally created in the Dayton Peace Agreement during nation building
in Bosnia in 1995. The High Representative was created to oversee development and
peacekeeping efforts through coordinating activities of NGOs, working with the local
government, and diffusing any conflicts that arose in nation building. As such, the High
Representative coordinated donor efforts, oversaw all development activities, and
reported progress to the donor community. 216
Richard Holbrooke was the chief negotiator of this legislation, the same man
who became the United States Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009. It
was Holbrooke who, quoted earlier in this section, clearly outlined the importance of
increasing funding through the Afghan government. Had Holbrooke not passed away
this past December, I have strong convictions that he would have stressed and
facilitated these changes for the US government. While Holbrooke’s duties ranged far
beyond nation building and development efforts, his passing emphasizes the
importance of immediately creating an international High Representative to oversee
and coordinate development efforts in Afghanistan.
Kai Eide, recently appointed UN Special Representative to Kabul, fills a vacancy
and need to coordinate communication between the UN and Afghanistan. However,
with such a substantive development program in Afghanistan, an appointment needs to
be made for an individual whose sole purpose revolves around international
development activities. A High Representative would be able to articulate to all donors
the importance of investing in trust funds or other modalities through the Afghan
Government, instead of launching individual development projects. Problems with
216 “Dayton Peace Agreement Annex 10: Agreement on Civilian Implementation,” Dayton Peace
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abundances of donor‐run projects have been mentioned earlier, but having a central
figure to dictate these issues will further support the need to invest through the Afghan
government. The High Representative can also issue what Matt Waldman referred to as
a “report card,” an annual report to each donor on where money was allocated, noting
all of the efficiencies and deficiencies of their aid involvement. 217

StateLevel
Aid and Development Problems within Afghanistan
Focusing specifically within the Afghan state, two major problems have been
highlighted throughout development initiatives: far too much aid is being allocated to
military‐based operations and not enough aid is being invested in Afghanistan at the
per‐capita level. Since 2001, 51% of international aid has gone to military‐based
funding, primarily in the forms of training and arming of the ANSF (ANA, ANP, ANBP,
etc.). The figures below reveal the most recent Afghan MoF report on donor assistance
by modality:

217 “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” Matt Waldman, ACBAR, March 2008, p. 4.
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Donor Managed Funding by Source (20012009) 218
Funding Source
Military Funding
1. ASFF
2. CSTC‐A
3. DoD CN
4. INCLE
5. CNTF
6. LOTFA
Non‐Military Funding
1. PRT
2. CERP
3. ASOP
4. DDP
5. ESF
Total

Total (US$ Billion)
$14,867.47

Percentage
50.9%

$14,322.08

49.1%

29,189.55

100%

While this number is staggering—as military‐based funding has accounted for over half
of all development and aid funding—US military activities, NATO‐led activities, and
military action of participating nations, plus all CIA‐based operations are not factored
into the figures above. As a result, military activity spending is far greater than what is
solely dedicated through donor funding. Using only reported material, it is clear the
international community is creating an Afghan security force based on quantity, rather
than quality. Recruitment and retention have trumped proper training as evident by
mass illiteracy and drug‐use in the ANSF.
This is not to say that Afghanistan does not need security sector activity.
Afghanistan has been and continues to be plagued by the militant actions of the Taliban
and powerful militias of local powerbrokers and needs a security force capable of
protecting its citizens and Kabul from factional takeover. In fact, while the ANDS was
218 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, “Donor Financial Review” (2009), p. 25.
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being created, 2/3 of the 34 surveyed provinces ranked security as the number one
priority. This survey reveals that Afghans have noted the importance of security‐based
activity and wish to address it as a priority.
I am not promoting scaling back security projects; so long as we are involved in
military operations in a war‐torn state, security and military development are
paramount to the success of the Afghan state. However, I do feel time and resources are
being wasted in current military development programs. The two Afghan‐run military
programs, the CNTF and LOTFA, trust funds that theoretically would increase
government capacity while targeting insurgents, suffer from a lack of both support and
funding. The US runs the DoD‐CN and INCLE, two counternarcotics programs with
similar project goals. But, each is run by different government branches as one is run by
the Department of Defense and the other by the Department of State. These programs
do not directly communicate with one another, and through project duplication are not
maximizing potential. Working separately towards a common universal goal creates
inefficiencies. Simply increasing project coordination would better improve program
efficiency and cut operational finances. The CNTF, until its role change in February
2010 (to focus efforts on capacity building of the Afghan MoI and MoD), was mirroring
the program goals of the ASFF. Both programs had a purpose to arm and train the ANSF.
There was no need to have two programs operating and funding the same end result.
This lack of fluidity and poorly streamlined programming drastically increases costs,
while decreasing output. Having projects focus on unique goals, designating one area of
focus per program, is a start for military programs to expedite efficiency. Another major
step is to reevaluate the necessary areas of focus in military development.
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Development projects have already recruited 171,600 personnel for the ANA
and 134,000 for the ANP, and are on pace to reach a target of 240,000 ANA personnel
by 2014. 219 However, as noted earlier, massive rates of illiteracy plague the ANSF as do
increasing levels of drug use. While initial efforts have succeeded in recruiting Afghans
for the ANSF, including women, attention now needs to shift to address training.
Durable training will tackle illiteracy issues, ensuring sustainable training and more
importantly ANSF retention of its soldiers. Attention also needs to be focused at the
ministerial level to ensure the MoD, MoCN and MoI receive the necessary capacity
building activities to strengthen their function.
Another state‐level issue in Afghanistan development practices is the lack of per‐
capita aid. RAND, a global policy think tank, conducted a comprehensive analysis on
international development programs, dating back to the German Marshall Plan all the
way through Afghanistan in 2005. This vast project provided immense comparative
research on international development programs. This research found that the
minimum annual per‐capita aid to stabilize a country coming out of conflict is $100. 220
Afghanistan at its highest point received has $57 per‐capita, compared to recent
development programs in Bosnia and East Timor, which received $679 and $233 per‐
capita, respectively. 221

219 “Outcomes from Afghanistan: The London Conference,” UK Foreign & Commonwealth Government,

January 2010.
220 “A Guide to Nation Building,” James Dobbins and Seth Jones, RAND, 2007.
221 “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” Matt Waldman, ACBAR, March 2008.
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Annual International Aid Per Capita Assistance, 2000 222

Afghanistan

Mean = $174
RAND Research = $100

57

Iraq

206
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526
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233
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Historians and policy experts improperly argue that assistance in Afghanistan is
failing simply by comparing per‐capita aid on a country‐to‐country basis. 223 This
argument fails to realize that each development program is unique and requires vastly
different approaches and programs. This argument does not distinguish between UN‐
led development cases and US‐led development cases, the extent of the development
222 “The UN’s Role in Nation‐Building: From the Congo to Iraq,” James Dobbins et al., RAND, 2005, p. 239.
223 Matt Waldman argues this position in “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” Matt

Waldman, ACBAR, March 2008.
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mission (whether light peacekeeping or heavy peace enforcing), or any economic
indicators of a country (GDP, purchasing power parity, inflation, etc.). There are far too
many factors that can influence the amount of aid per‐capita a country receives. The
RAND assessment takes these issues into consideration, placing all states on an equal
economic continuum by converting all economic statistics into a universal standard.
Then from this point, RAND researched development programs from the Marshall Plan
to Afghanistan, and discovered that the minimum per‐capita assistance necessary to
stabilize a country coming out of conflict is $100. Afghanistan is roughly halfway
towards the RAND target, and could drastically increase its per‐capita aid with a few
simple changes. Increasing civilian‐targeted development operations, minimizing
contract overhead, increasing contracts given to Afghanistan‐based corporations, and
increasing the amount of aid through the GIRoA will direct correlate with higher per‐
capita aid in Afghanistan.

Recommendations for Afghanistan
How to Ensure Sustainable Development and a Functioning Government
Looking at the major development programs below, achievements and criticisms
are centralized in very general topics. Achievements are concentrated on successful
short‐term aid projects, increasing international donor involvement and increasing
central government capacity. Criticisms focus on wasting money, investing in expensive
foreign contactors, duplicating tasks due to poor coordination, and lacking support to
the GIRoA at the local and federal levels.
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Development Program Achievements and Criticisms
Program

PRT

CERP

ASOP

DDP

ESF

ASFF
CSTCA
DoD CN
INCLE

ARTF

LOTFA
CNTF

Achievements
‐ Operate in 32 of 34 provinces
‐ Increase involvement of foreign nations in
the development of Afghanistan
‐ Yield concrete change in short period of
time with minimal resources
‐ Quick, rapid money for projects
‐ Separating from PRTs allows immediate
funding without financial requests
‐ Support counterinsurgency activity
through building local governance
‐ Created by Afghans, but run multilaterally
‐ Rewards good governance with aid
‐ Run by Afghan Ministries
‐ Increases GIRoA’s local capacity by
delivering funds to local government
‐ Supports the work of PRTs, facilitating
efficient allocation of resources and
continual development
‐ Primary means for arming and training the
ANA (171,600) and ANP (134,000)
‐ Built an additional 88 ANP headquarters
‐ Increases the capacity of MoI and MoD, as
of a recent change in role in 2010
‐ Targets the industry the Taliban taxes and
uses to fund operations
‐ Invests 88% of funding through Afghan
contractors or Ministries
‐ As a DoS program, regularly publishes
financial statements and program results
‐ Increased international donor support
with 32 donor nations
‐ Disburses 91.4% of allocated funds
‐ Supports Afghan‐created and Afghan‐led
development programs (NSP, EQUIP, etc.)
‐ Funded salaries and budget of ANP
through the Afghan MoF under NIM
‐ Paid the salaries of 96,000 ANP
‐ Followed NIM to increase GIRoA capacity
‐ Supported alternative livelihood CN
activities in 21 out of 31 projects

Criticisms
‐ Poor coordination and conflicting
priorities due to too many lead nations
‐ Fail to align projects with GIRoA plans
‐ Do not emphasize long‐term sustainable
development
‐ Not accountable for funding that goes
through PRT projects
‐ Highly decentralized and dependent on
the opinion of one commander
‐ Involvement of local elders in District
Councils increases governmental rule by
personal relationships
‐ Lacks civilian participation
‐ New program not yet evaluated

‐ Most of funding goes to local PRT projects
‐ Only disbursed 55.3% of allocated funds
‐ 99% of funding went to US or
International contractors
‐ Received 49% of all US donor aid (~$20
billion)
‐ Funds an army of quantity, not quality
‐ Duplicated responsibilities of ASFF
‐ Stretched to maximum capabilities,
jeopardizing long‐term viability of ANA
‐ Primary efforts to seize drugs and destroy
land does not solve the drug problem
‐ Is a second US development program
focused on counternarcotics issues
‐ Poor financial and program oversight
N/A

‐ Not accountable for the quality of ANP
‐ No longer assisting in the capacity
building of the MoF
‐ Lacked budgetary support as only $99
million was given for a $900 million budget
‐ Did not directly support the capacity
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building of the Afghan MoCN

With achievements and criticisms very clear, the international community and the
GIRoA need to take a few steps in aid practices to ensure sustainable development in
Afghanistan: Increasing the amount of aid through the GIRoA or trust funds; increasing
the role of local government officials; increasing GIRoA domestic revenue; and
increasing regional economic cooperation.
The importance of increasing aid through the Afghan government has been
made clear. The only way to increase the capacity of the Afghan government is to
directly increase the money it has control over. With more money comes more
responsibility, allowing the GIRoA to grow and expand. Increasing aid through the
GIRoA also directly correlates with an increase in aligning donor aid with GIRoA
priorities. This means the ANDS, the Afghan‐created development program, can begin
to receive the support, primarily financial, that is needed to spur development efforts in
Afghanistan. To address this issue I propose an immediate 20% annual increase in
pledged aid to the ARTF over the next three years. This 20% international mandate will
ensure that the operating budget for the ARTF will increase by 73% by 2014, the year in
which the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany will end combat operations
in Afghanistan and withdraw troops. 224

224 “UK on target to withdraw combat troops from Afghanistan by 2014,” Richard Norton‐Taylor, The

Guardian, November 19, 2010.
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Proposed Fund Increase to ARTF (20112014) 225

ARTF

Year

Pledged Amount

2011
2012
2013
2014

$1046.71
$1256.05
$1507.26
$1808.71

Percent Increase from
Current Levels
‐‐‐‐‐‐
20%
44%
73%

Proposing a change of this magnitude will not require additional donor funds, but
rather will force donor nations to cut funding from individual projects and reallocate
funds to the ARTF. As more and more aid is funneled through trust funds or directly to
the GIRoA, the international donor community will begin to effectively and efficiently
transition responsibility over Afghanistan to the Afghan people.
All trust funds and some donor‐managed projects, primarily the CSTC‐A and to a
lesser extent the DDP and ASOP, have supported ministerial‐level programs to increase
government capacity. While these programs have increased federal‐level governance, a
new focus needs to be shifted to address the capacity of local governance, specifically
connecting the federal government branches to these at the local level. As previously
mentioned, the creation of a High Representative to Afghanistan would serve an
important role in communicating this change to the international donor community and
facilitating this change within Afghanistan.
Afghanistan held provincial council elections in 2005, and now to unite these
elected officials with the CDCs and other district‐level leaders, it is necessary to increase
their involvement with PRTs. PRTs have large budgets, and with outside contributions

225 Figures for 2011 were taken from the World Bank ARTF Administrator’s Report on Financial Status

from January 2011 and additional years were calculated.
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from CERP and ESF, allowing the provincial councils to work more closely with their
respective PRT will increase provincial cooperation and Afghan ownership of
development projects. Not only does this align donor efforts with the Afghans, but it
also increases the capacity and accountability of provincial level councilors.
One of, if not the most important aspects of developing a government dependent
on international aid, is building its capacity to tax. The LOTFA successfully created the
building blocks to lead towards an eventual electronic tax payment and collection
system. Creating the Electronic Payment System and Electronic Fund Transfer System
set the precedent for the MoF to transfer governmental funds and pay salaries of
government employees. Afghan government officials have already mastered this
technology. With transition methods in place within Afghanistan, the added bonus of
electronic records provides a transparent fund allocation report to the international
donor community. An electronic tax system would function on the same basic system as
the previous programs and be the means for the GIRoA to collect taxes and generate
domestic revenue. Taxing electronically would again provide transparent tax records to
ensure accountability and mitigate fraud, but more importantly would be the first step
in ensuring Afghanistan can begin a transition of removing dependence on international
aid.
Supporting regional economic cooperation is a very diverse but key
development initiative that further strengthens Afghanistan’s economy. This step is a
complex combination of decreasing counternarcotics activities, while promoting new
and alternative economic opportunities. In the counternarcotics realm, following the
guidelines set forth by the CNTF reveals that the most effective immediate approach to
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solving drug‐dependency is the promotion of alternative livelihoods. To truly be able to
promote alternative economic opportunities, Afghanistan and the international
community need to cement regional trade agreements. From 2001 to 2004 trade with
neighbor Pakistan increased from $20 million to $700 million. 226 Additional measures
have been taken to spur trade with neighbors, including electricity deals with Iran in
Herat, and opening trade routes to both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan by cutting tariffs and
building physical roads and bridges into each country. 227 The only way to spur regional
trade is to increase regional cooperation and construction of roads and infrastructure,
so people can the means to reach new markets.
Successful development efforts have been achieved in Afghanistan as 12,200km
(~7,580 miles) of road have been rehabilitated or paved, directly increasing trade
access and opportunities. 228 73% of the Afghan population now has telecommunication
access. 6 million children currently have access to primary education, the highest total
ever in Afghanistan. 229 Even healthcare has seen dramatic successes, as 85% of the
population now has access to basic healthcare, a drastic increase from 9% in 2002. 230
While these physical changes do speak volumes about the change that has
occurred in Afghanistan, changes need to be made from the international level to the
Afghan‐state level to ensure that the massive financial investment in Afghanistan is
secured.

226 Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos: the United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan,

Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York: Viking, 2008, p. 193.
227 Ibid.
228 “Afghanistan National Development Strategy,” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008‐2013, p. v.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
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The international community no longer can neglect the importance of
supporting the GIRoA through direct investment, including increased support for trust
funds. Decreasing contracts for American and foreign companies, increases available
funds for investment and ensures aid is invested in the country it seeks to develop.
Individual donor activities from states cannot persist—short‐term humanitarian efforts
have been maxed‐out and need to shift to long‐term sustainable projects. Eight years of
humanitarian relief and short‐term aid projects under the Bush administration have
neglected the long‐term effectiveness of the Afghan government and the long‐term
sustainability of the state. Bush’s ideals of removing the Taliban and quelling the
support and harboring of international terrorists shares common goals with Obama’s
notion of nation‐building in a fractious state. In order to succeed in both areas, a
successful development program needs to be utilized. Rebuilding and constructing an
Afghan state has involved over 40 countries and the work of countless NGOs and IGOs.
To ensure the success of this $40 billion investment, change needs to be expedited.
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